IMD 1.18: 6/07/2013 11:14:57 @Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ЕЩФБЧ@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@еЦУс@@@@@@Б@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@т@@@жД@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ИДЩс@860, D-3 614@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@830503рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@рсррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Д@@@@ЦЧДБгБ@@@@@@@@@@@ррхст@рсррстчцррш@В@Чз@@@@@@@@@рхст@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@Дччррс@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@@ ЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUЄЄUUїяUUяяUUяяUUрUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUUU§¤Ўяџ¤ $Ўџ$¤Є$°і¶№јїВЕИЛОСФЧЪЭагжймптхшыюЂяђ0`@э1@FATэ22QDDD0P??????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ‘#‘N66001-83-R-0328–——„SECTION C - DESCRIPTION OR SPECIFICATIONS…———C.1™„Introduction.…——The Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), San Diego, conducts a variety of research,—development, test and evaluation, and Fleet support programs primarily in the—areas of Command Control, Ocean Surveillance, and Antisubmarine Warfare Systems.——C.2™„Scope….——The Contractor shall, on an "as ordered" basis, conduct simulation studies,—feasibility studies, Ђяђ0`@э1@LATэ24D0DQDP?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ„SECTION C - DESCRIPTION OR SPECIFICATIONS…——C.1™™„INTRODUCTION…——™™The Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), San Diego, conducts a—variety of research, development, test and evaluation, and Fleet support programs–primarily in the areas of Command Control, Ocean Surveillance, and Antisubmarine–Warfare Systems.——™™The Fleet Readiness Office provides applications appraisal and program—development support to the Commander, the Technical DirectorЂяeffectiveness measurements and design, fabricate and install—prototype hardware in support of the studies and assessments. Results of these —efforts shall be documented in accordance with the requirements contained in DD —Form 1423, Contract Data Requirements List, Exhibit "A". This effort shall be—limited to work in direct support of Fleet operating units.——C.3™„Background.…——Fleet requirements are urgent and growing due to high involvement in the application—of R&D to increase operational readi$ яCBishopэ830622э830623эD80э0э4э@xA@AюCBishopэ830622э830623э 80э0э4э@xD@AюJ. FOSTERэ830623э830623эD80э0э4э@HH@AюTF386-83э830606э830627эD80э5э32э@tB@AюTF386-83э830606э830627э 80э5э32э@tC@AюJ. FOSTERэ830623э830627э 80э1э8э@\B@AюD. COOKэ э830627эD80э0э2эADD@AюD. COOKэ э830627э 80э0э2эADH@AюTF386.83.aэ830606э830627эD80э5э28эALH@AюTF38Ђяђ0`@э1@FATэ22QDDD0P??????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ‘#‘N66001-83-R-0328–——„SECTION C - DESCRIPTION OR SPECIFICATIONS…———C.1™„Introduction.…——The Naval Ocean systems Center (NOSC), San Diego, conducts a variety of research,—development, test and evaluation, and Fleet support programs primarily in the—areas of Command Control, Ocean Surveillance, and Antisubmarine Warfare Systems.——C.2™„Scope….——The Contractor shall, on an "as ordered" basis, conduct simulation studies,—feasibility studies, Ђяђ0`@э1@LATэ24D0DQDP?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ„SECTION C - DESCRIPTION OR SPECIFICATIONS…————C.1™™„INTRODUCTION…——™™The Naval Ocean Systems Center (NOSC), San Diego, conducts a—variety of research, development, test and evaluation, and Fleet support programs–primarily in the areas of Command Control, Ocean Surveillance, and Antisubmarine–Warfare Systems.——™™The Fleet Readiness Office provides applications appraisal and program—development support to the Commander, the Technical DirectЂя, the Directors of—major NOSC mission area organizations, to the Fleet, and to the Navy, Marine—Corps and U. S. Coast Guard commands. The functional description of the Fleet—Readiness Office (Code 18) is as follows:——™™Provides technical management and administration of near-term and–™™quick-reaction technical support for Fleet and Marine Corps operational–™™commands; evaluation and identification of Fleet operational problems–™™through Fleet exercise liaison and participation, tactics developmentЂяness capability.——C.4™„Technical Requirements….——The contractor shall provide systems design and development support for ASW and under-—water acoustic systems, command and control and combat systems, and associated—engineering support function areas, as described below.——C.4.1™„ASW and Underwater Acoustic Systems Engineering.…——ASW and underwater acoustic systems engineering shall include design, development,—scientific and engineering effort in hardware and software in the following areas:——C.4.1.Ђяor, the Directors of—major NOSC mission area organizations, to the Fleet, and to the Navy, Marine—Corps and U. S. Coast Guard commands. The functional description of the Fleet—Readiness Office (Code 18) is as follows:——™™Provides technical management and administration of near-term and–™™quick-reaction technical support for Fleet and Marine Corps operational–™™commands; evaluation and identification of Fleet operational problems–™™through Fleet exercise liaison and participation, tactics developmeЂя documented in accordance with the provisions contained in–DD Form 1423, CDRL, Exhibit "A".——C.3™™„BACKGROUND…——™™Fleet requirements are urgent and growing due to high involvement in—the application of R&D to increase operational readiness capability.—Availability of Center personnel to meet program and Fleet support demands—is not assured, necessitating contractual procurements of deliverable items.——C.4™™™„TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS…——™™The contractor shall provide systems design and development suppЂя–™™and evaluation support, war gaming; and technical direction, technical–™™management and/or technical support of operationally oriented NOSC–™™programs, measurement range activities and Fleet use of programmable–™™calculators.——C,2™™„SCOPE…——™™The contractor shall, on an "as ordered basis" conduct simulation—studies, feasibility studies, effectiveness measurements and design, fabricate and—install prototype equipment in support of these studies and assessments. Results of–these efforts shall beЂя1™Measurement range support, target strength calculations and measurements;—target strength augementation; ship system silencing investigation and evaluation;—radiated noise measurement, trial monitoring, evaluation and reduction by means—of appropriate engineering designs, sonar system self-noise measurement, evaluation —and reduction by means of engineering calculations and design proposals and development—of operational procedures; machinery noise determinations by means of measurement and —evalЂяort—for (1) ASW and underwater acoustic systems, (2) command and control and combat–systems, and (3) associated engineering support function areas. To evaluate and–guide progress, and to maintain cognizance of costs, monthly reporting may be–required.——C.4.1™„ASW AND Underwater Acoustic Systems Engineering…——™™ASW and underwater acoustic systems engineering shall include design,—development, scientific and engineering effort in hardware and software in—the following areas:——‘#‘1–”C.4.1.1™MeasuremeЂяђ0`@э1@AATэ21PP0PD0PD0A3A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ‘#‘TAC D&E MONTHLY PROJECT STATUS REPORT–——A.™„Project Title:…™™Antisurface Weapons Employment Tactical Decision Aid—™™™™™for Antisurface Warfare Commander———™„Project Number…:™N0014-NWR-WR-83-30195, NR: Q2D-318——B.™„Requesting Command:…™COMTHIRDFLT N-70——™„Reference:… ™™COMTHIRDFLT ltr to CNO (OP-953) Ser N70/1272 dtd 5 Oct 82——C.™„Action Center/Lab…:™Code 161, NOSC——™„Start Date:…™™1 Dec 82——™„Project Engineers:…™Julie Foster, Dr. яЂ ЂЂЂ!$'*-0369<?BEHKNQTWZ]`cfilorux{~Ѓ„‡ЉЌђ“–™њџўҐЁ«®±ґ·єЅАГЖЙМПТХШЫЮбдзкнруцщьЂяshall include—technology assessment, engineering design, engineering development and measure-—ment and evaluation including Fleet exercise support in the following areas:—Concept development and system design and analysis; analysis of information—display and data processing technology for tactical system application; computer/—microprocessor shipboard decision aids; computer/microprocessor control systems,—data links and displays; development of system or subsystem performance criteria;—review and Ђяassessment of operational requirements; hardware and software check-—out and integration of individual system elements or complete demonstration —systems; test bed design and evaluation; simulation system design and assessment.——C.4.3™„Engineering Support Function Areas…——™™Engineering design and development support function areas for ASW and—underwater acoustic systems and command control and combat systems include the—following:——C.4.3.1™„Engineering Design and Development…——™™Computer simulationЂяended solutions quickly based on current tactical doctrine as—™™directed by COMTHIRDFLT.——™2.™„Technical Objective:…™™Develop a decision aid for ASUWC based on—™™current ASUW weapon employment tactical doctrine as directed by COMTHIRDFLT.—™™Ђяnt range support; target strength caslculations and—measurements; target strength augmentation; ship system silencing investigation—and evaluation; radiated noise measurement, trial monitoring, evaluation and—noise reduction by means of appropriate engineering designs; sonar system self-—noise measurement, evaluation and reduction by means of appropriate—engineering designs; sonar system self-noise measurement, evaluation and—reduction by means of engineering calculations, design recommendations aЂяnt–™™and evaluation support, war gaming; and technical direction, technical–™™management and/or technical support of operationally oriented NOSC–™™programs, measurement range activities and Fleet use of programmable–™™calculators.——C.2™™„SCOPE…——™™The contractor shall, on an "as ordered basis" conduct simulation—studies, feasibility studies, effectiveness measurements and design, fabricate and—install prototype equipment in support of these studies and assessments. Results of–these efforts shall Ђя Wesley Shelberg——D.™„Purpose:…——™1.™„Operational Background:…™Currently information is available about the—™™technical capabilities and use of own weapon systems against surface threats.—™™However, the ASUWC has no concise and accessible guidance on the order and—™™times at which he should employ his weapons. Only general information is—™™available on ASUW tactics and this is difficult to consult during operations.—™™The tactical decision aid to be developed in this project will suggest —™™recommЂяnd—development of operational procedures; machinery noise determinations by—means of measurement and evaluation of waterborne signal levels and—spectral analysis of equipment vibration (including engineering development—of data acquisition procedures); hull and machinery vibration energy transmission—in the water; hull to water coupling impedence measurement; observation and—engineering calculations, experimentation and verification of physical —phenomena involved in acoustic waterborne transmissioЂяn; and engineering–investigation of reverberation phenomena and impact on weapon systems.——C.4.1.2™Applicable systems may include active sonar; passive—sonar; fixed, towed and floating arrays; signal processing and communications;—exercise and test target design; surface ship, submarine or craft machinery;–advanced development models, engineering development models or in-service Fleet–systems.——C.4.2™„Command Control and Combat Systems Engineering…——™™Command Control and Combat Systems Engineering Ђя drawings to–detailing construction, assembly, installation and interface arrangements–mechanical and electrical ђ0`@э1@LATэ24D0DQDP?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђcomponents, subsystems and systems; investigation of—•ђ0`@э1@LATэ24D0DQDP?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@p@pЂя–™™and evaluation support, war gaming; and technical direction, technical–™™management and/or technical support of operationally oriented NOSC–™™programs, measurement range activities and Fleet use of programmable–™™calculators.——C.2™™„SCOPE…——™™The contractor shall, on an "as ordered basis" conduct simulation—studies, feasibility studies, effectiveness measurements and design, fabricate and—install prototype equipment in support of these studies and assessments. Results of–these efforts shall beЂя documented in accordance with the provisions contained in–DD Form 1423, CDRL, Exhibit "A".——C.3™™„BACKGROUND…——™™Fleet requirements are urgent and growing due to high involvement in—the application of R&D to increase operational readiness capability.—Availability of Center personnel to meet program and Fleet support demands—is not assured, necessitating contractual procurements of deliverable items.——C.4™™™„TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS…——™™The contractor shall provide systems design and development suppЂяpport—for (1) ASW and underwater acoustic systems, (2) command and control and combat–systems, and (3) associated engineering support function areas. To evaluate and–guide progress, and to maintain cognizance of costs, monthly reporting may be–required.——C.4.1™„ASW AND Underwater Acoustic Systems Engineering…——™™ASW and underwater acoustic systems engineering shall include design,—development, scientific and engineering effort in hardware and software in—the following areas:——‘#‘1–”C.4.1.1™MeasureЂя models may be developed and/or employed—and may require the development and checkout of individual software modules and—sub-programs to be integrated with or utilized with existing software programs; —mathematical and engineering calculations and performance predictions as–required; application of good engineering practice and fundamental principles of–physics and engineering as a requirement in the creative formulation of mechanical–and electrical component and system design; design and interfaceЂяmeЂяbe documented in accordance with the provisions contained in–DD Form 1423, CDRL, Exhibit "A".——C.3™™„BACKGROUND…——™™Fleet requirements are urgent and growing due to high involvement in—the application of R&D to increase operational readiness capability.—Availability of Center personnel to meet program and Fleet support demands—is not assured, necessitating contractual procurements of deliverable items.——C.4™™™„TECHNICAL REQUIREMENTS…——™™The contractor shall provide systems design and development suЂяuation of waterborne signal levels and spectral analysis of equipment vibration—(including engineering development of data acquisition procedures); hull and machinery—vibration transmission in the water; hull to water coupling impedance measurement;—observation and engineering calculations, experimentation and verifcation of physical—phenomena involved in waterborne transmission; and engineering investigatin of —reverberation phenomena and weapons system impact.——C.4.1.2™Systems application may incЂяlude active sonar; passive sonar; fixed, towed—and floating arrays; signal processing and communications; friendly or other hull—target strength; exercise target design; torpedoes; surface ship, submarine or—craft machinery; advanced development models, engineering development models or in-—service Fleet systems.—————”ђ0`@э1@FATэ22QDDD0P??????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ——C.4.2™„Command Control and Combat Systems Engineering.…——Command Control and Combat Systems Engineering shall include teЂяd—development of operational procedures; machinery noise determinations by—means of measurement and evaluation of waterborne signal levels and—spectral analysis of equipment vibration (including engineering development—of data acquisition procedures); hull and machinery vibration energy transmission—in the water; hull to water coupling impedence measurement; observation and—engineering calculations, experimentation and verification of physical —phenomena involved in acoustic waterborne transmissionЂяnt range support; target strength calculations and—measurements; target strength augmentation; ship system silencing investigation—and evaluation; radiated noise measurement, trial monitoring, evaluation and—noise reduction by means of appropriate engineering designs; sonar system self-—noise measurement, evaluation and reduction by means of appropriate—engineering designs; sonar system self-noise measurement, evaluation and—reduction by means of engineering calculations, design recommendations anЂяssessment of operational requirements; hardware and software check-—out and integration of individual system elements or complete demonstration —systems; test bed design and evaluation; simulation system design and assessment.——C.4.3™„Engineering Support Function Areas…——™™Engineering design and development support function areas for ASW and—underwater acoustic systems and command control and combat systems include the—following:——C.4.3.1™„Engineering Design and Development…——™™Computer simulation Ђяort—for (1) ASW and underwater acoustic systems, (2) command and control and combat–systems, and (3) associated engineering support function areas. To evaluate and–guide progress, and to maintain cognizance of costs, monthly reporting may be–required.——C.4.1™„ASW AND Underwater Acoustic Systems Engineering…——™™ASW and underwater acoustic systems engineering shall include design,—development, scientific and engineering effort in hardware and software in—the following areas:——‘#‘1–”C.4.1.1™MeasuremeЂя; and engineering–investigation of reverberation phenomena and impact on weapon systems.——C.4.1.2™Applicable systems may include active sonar; passive—sonar; fixed, towed and floating arrays; signal processing and communications;—exercise and test target design; surface ship, submarine or craft machinery;–advanced development models, engineering development models or in-service Fleet–systems.——C.4.2™„Command Control and Combat Systems Engineering…——™™Command Control and Combat Systems Engineering sЂяhall include—technology assessment, engineering design, engineering development and measure-—ment and evaluation including Fleet exercise support in the following areas:—Concept development and system design and analysis; analysis of information—display and data processing technology for tactical system application; computer/—microprocessor shipboard decision aids; computer/microprocessor control systems,—data links and displays; development of system or subsystem performance criteria;—review and aЂяђ0`@э1@LATэ2?A0D0PA0D0P?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ‘#‘INDEPENDENT GOVERNMENT ESTIMATE FOR ONE-YEAR PERIOD–——™™%™—™„of Effort…™„Hours…™„Man/Years…———Technical Coordinator/Contract Mgrђ0`@э1@LATэ2?AAD0PQ0DDP?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђЂяture—of ASW, underwater acoustics, command-control and combat systems, and ocean—surveillance systems as appropriate to each specific work statement issued.—Estimated 3,900 manhours per annum.——™™„Technician… must have a minimum of 2 years training (or equivalent—experience*) in math, physics, engineering or computer science, and at least one —year experience directly related to analysis, functional specification, engineering,—testing or employment of military operational systems. Estimated 1,800 KE яЂ ЂЂЂЂЂЂ$Ђ*-Ђ'Ђ$*Ђ'!Ђ!0Ђ-3Ђ06Ђ39Ђ6< Ђ9? Ђbob.2–—–—Total lines 0 number of chars = 2–—% 'Ђяђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђstaTUS –—–— LOCALNET 20/100 3E00 0000 1A V2 –—–—UNIT 40CE,0 BAUD 4800 IDLE 1–—GROUP A PARITY NONE EOM COUNT 59–—LOCATION 9,148 STOPS 1 EOM CHARACTER NONE –—COMMAND BREAK AUTOBAUD OFF NEWLINE 0D–—LISTEN ON DCD CONTROL OFF EXPAND NONE–—P''Ђя@ыьыьэђ4.2 BSD UNIX #7: Tue Feb 28 07:38:11 PST 1984–—–—TERM = (vt100) dumb–— 9:02am up 4 days, 4:21, 13 users, load average: 0.46, 0.88, 1.11–—% wpcat -c>є?–—% є?–—% ls -l–—total 50–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 130 Apr 23 08:54 bob–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 24930 Apr 23 08:56 bob.1–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 2 Apr 23 08:58 bob.2–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 76 Apr 4 09:09 cdx.trace–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 2518 Mar 28 09:36 demo–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 2256 Mar 28 09:25 jim–—-rw''Ђя NONE–—PRIVILEGE OFF DTR CONTROL OFF XON 11–—MAXSESSION 1 ECHO OFF XOFF 13–—PCALL OFF QUIET OFF FLOW XON –—PUNIT 0000,0 TIMEOUT 0–—–—SESSIONS - 1–—1) 0ABC,0* ACTIVE –—–—#–—–—Total lines 37 number of chars = 130–—% wpcat -c>bob.1–—– 25– 50–”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ 75– 100– 125– 150– 175– я'Ђ!$'*-0369<?BEHKNQTWZ]`cfilorux{~Ѓ„‡ЉЌђ“–™њџўҐЁ«®±ґ·єЅАГЖЙМПТХШЫЮбдзкнруцщь''ЂяRIVILEGE OFF DTR CONTROL OFF XON 11–—MAXSESSION 1 ECHO OFF XOFF 13–—PCALL OFF QUIET OFF FLOW XON –—PUNIT 0000,0 TIMEOUT 0–—–—SESSIONS - NONE–—–—#caLL abc–—# CALL COMPLETED TO 0ABC,0–—–—–—4.2 BSD UNIX (nosc)–—––—–login: hays–—Password:–—What ANI? (dav): –—Last login: Mon Apr 23 08:38:50 on ttyh7–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@'(Ђя------- 1 hays 162 Mar 20 11:24 mbox–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 374 Apr 4 09:13 shirley–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 0 Apr 4 09:09 shirleyd–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 7161 Mar 12 10:22 text–—-rw-r--r-- 1 hays 7163 Mar 12 10:24 text.1–—% wpcat -c>bob.2–—– 25– 50– 75– 100– 125– 150– 175– 200– 225– 250– 275– 300– 325–”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ 350– 375– 400–—Total lines 403 number of chars = 24930–—% ls–—bob ( я(Ђ!$'*-0369<?BEHKNQTWZ]`cfilorux{~Ѓ„‡ЉЌђ“–™њџўҐЁ«®±ґ·єЅАГЖЙМПТХШЫЮбдзкнруцщь я(Ђ!$'*-0369<?BEHKNQTWZ]`cfilorux{~Ѓ„‡ЉЌђ“–™њџўҐЁ«®±ґ·єЅАГЖЙМПТХШЫЮбдзкнруцщь я(Ђ!$'*-0369<?BEHKNQTWZ]`cfilorux{~Ѓ„‡ЉЌђ“–™њџўҐЁ«®±ґ·єЅАГЖЙМПТХШЫЮбдзкнруцщь я(Ђ!$'*-0369<?BEHKNQTWZ]`cfilorux{~Ѓ„‡ЉЌђ“–™њџўҐЁ«®±ґ·єЅАГЖЙМПТХШЫЮбдзкнруцщь(Ђяђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ–—#staTUS –—–— LOCALNET 20/100 3E00 0000 1A V2 –—–—UNIT 40CE,0 BAUD 4800 IDLE 1–—GROUP A PARITY NONE EOM COUNT 59–—LOCATION 15,148 STOPS 1 EOM CHARACTER NONE –—COMMAND BREAK AUTOBAUD OFF NEWLINE 0D–—LISTEN ON DCD CONTROL OFF EXPAND NONE(Ђяђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ(Ђяђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ–—#IIZ UNKNOWN COMMAND–—#caLL 10–—# CALL COMPLETED TO 0010,0–—–—–—4.2 BSD UNIX (cod)–—––—–login: south–—Password:–—What ANI? (dmx): –—Last login: Wed Apr 25 08:27:54 on ttyi8–—4.2 BSD UNIX #13: Wed Apr 18 23:49:49 PST 1984–—–—TERM = (h19) dє?Wed Apr 25 09:27:11 PST 1984–—18mail 19tour cleanup newfile res.3f test–—Nothing is faster than the speed of light...–—–—To prove this to yourself, try opening the refrigerator door before–—the ligЂя) я)Ђ!$'*-0369<?BEHKNQTWZ]`cfilorux{~Ѓ„‡ЉЌђ“–™њџўҐЁ«®±ґ·єЅАГЖЙМПТХШЫЮбдзкнруцщь))Ђяographic –—document was reviewed by various commands. It was also indicated that generally–—the document appeared to be addressing the right topics but may be diffuclt to–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђimplement; therefore this TACMEMO-type approach was initiated. The TACMEMO–—consists of an introduction which describes the objective of the TACMEMO and–—highlights the needs for the TACMEMO. The second section describes procedures–—for describing ocean parameters and their))Ђяjerry jerry.arpa–—jerry jerry.arpa differ: char 2, line 1–—7% cat jerry–— ___________–—–— (U) Last year the writer participated in the UNITED EFFORT/NORTHERN–— WEDDING Exercises-82, (UE/EW-82) as an augmentee to CCG-8's Staff aboard the–— USS AMERICA (CV 66). The writer's primary objective was to implement and–— evaluate the C3CM support concept developed by NOSC personnel. Upon completion–— of the exercise the writer was asked to return to pa))Ђяvations.–—–— _______________________________–—–— (C) The C3CM 30 day and 72 hour support charts were used during the–— exercise. The 30 day chart was evaluated for its accuracy and usefulness as–— a planning aid. The 72 hour chart was used primarily as a satellite vulnerability–— display. A few of the 72 hour charts were provided to the HMS HERMES for–— their use in satellite vulnerability determination and display. The EMCON–— polic)Ђяђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ–—Total lines 470 number of chars = 27152–—[1] + Done 18mail >> inbox–—2% tail є?–—2% є?є?–—2% h–— 2 h –— 1 wpcat -c >> jerry.arpa –—3% tail jerry.arpa–—–—–— C. H. STURTEVANT–—–—Copy to:–—62–—–—–—џ–—–—4% tail jerry–—distribute the oceanographic document.–—–—3. ________–—–— In the previous progress report it was noted that the strawman ocean))Ђя5% ls -l–—total 136–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 46080 Apr 24 13:24 ,test–—-rwxr--r-- 1 south 108 Mar 13 10:34 18mail–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 31 Apr 2 11:01 cleanup–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 819 Apr 25 10:08 inbox–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 25600 Apr 25 10:05 jerry–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 27153 Apr 25 10:08 jerry.arpa–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 602 Apr 2 11:01 male–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 1219 Apr 2 10:51 master–—-rw-r--r-- 1 south 33633 Apr 24 13:27 test–—6% cmp ))Ђяrticipate in the UNITED–— EFFORT/OCEAN SAFARI-83, (UE/OS-83) Exerices. The writer and Mr. Ken Miller,–— of the Foreign Technology Division (FTD), Wright Patterson AFB, participated in–— UE/OS-83 as consultants to CCG-8. On C3CM the objective was to continue to–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ evaluate the C3CM support concept being refined at NOSC. The following is a–— report on this C3CM evaluation and on other exercise/real world obser)*Ђяy was also determined from the information provided by the TEK 4052–— RECSAT Program.–—–— (U) The 30 day prediction chart for the exercise was completed on 9 May–— 83. This chart was then updated three times during the exercise. The–— following is a review of the updates:–—–— a. (U) On 26 May 83, they threat was reviewed with CAPT Buckley (N2) and the–— chart predictions were updated to reflect this review.–—–— *)*Ђяnformation provided to SESS equipped ship. The–— surface ship position prediction is probably the easiest because of the slow–— speed of the threat and the resources available to track it. Conversely the–— usbsurface target location is the most difficult to predict accurately. The–— ASW information (S3, SOSUS, Intel, Sonar, etc.) is provided to the ship but–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ unless the submarine is sighted or is acoustical**Ђяe developed–— last year but instead of using a maneuvering board chart the vulnerability–— swath was overlayed on a map also indicating the ship's position and direction–— of movement. This was accomplished by using the vulnerability information–— provided by the TEK 4052 RECSAT Program and plotting it on the HP 9020–— display. The display was transferred to the hardcopy unit thereby providing–— the master to make a viewgraph.–—–— (C) T**Ђяcal decision–— aid computer. Even the NOSC method of bar generation and coloration was utilized–— in the program.–—–— Rџ џ_Eџ џ_Cџ џ_Sџ џ_Aџ џ_Tџ џ_ џ џ_Pџ џ_rџ џ_oџ џ_gџ џ_rџ џ_aџ џ_mџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (S) The TEK 4052 RECSAT Program was used during the entire deployment.–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ This capability not only provided a tailored product for the C3CM support–— cahrts but it was used as an evaluation tool f**Ђяe used. The determination of the number–— of overflights in any one day in the future is not too critical. However, if–— a deception has to be planned or if the TF's EMCON policy is to be determined–— with consideratin of satellite vulnerability, then the rise and set times must–— be accurate. It was decided that a study should be conducted to determine–— if using coudated charlie elements would significantly effect the calculations–— of the vulnerabilit**Ђяly held for long periods it–— is difficult to hultec and target them. Because of the variability and–— accuracy of the sensor information provided it is difficult to correlate the–— data and maintain a good accurate ASW picture.–—–— (S) In addition to the 30 day and 72 hour charts, a RORSAT vulnerability–— viewgraph was provided as a briefing aide because the OS Exercise included–— two BOGUS RORSATS. This RORSAT viewgraph was similar to the on**Ђяo summarize the above; the 72 hour and 24 hour charts are useful in–— providing accurate daily pictures of the threat if they are maintained routinely.–— The 30 day chart is useful as a planning and a reconstruction aid. Automation–— of the updating and plotting of the chart is required to minimize the manpower–— presently required to chart the information. The satellite vulnerability sections–— of the 72 hour charts were implemented in the CCG-8's HP 9020 tacti**Ђяor the SKR-7 project as well–— as for the validation of the HP 9020 SATVUL Program. It was noted that the–— TEK 4052 processing of satellite vulnerability data is approximately twice–— as fast as the NIPs but is an order of magnitude slower than the HP 9020.–—–— (S) Normally the charlie elements are provided to the ship weekly. To–—–— provide the initial threat prediction for the UNITED EFFORT Exercise, the–— charlie elements for 19 May 83 wer*+Ђяy windows. Fortunately the ship was being provided daily–— charlie elements for the RORSAT to support the SKR-7 Project. These daily–— elements were catalogued in the TEK 4052 and compared for differences in the element–— parameters. Each set was then used to calculate the vulnerability times for a–— specific PIM. The results showed that the elements do change to some degree from–— day to day but the rise and set times were affected by no more than one minute–+*+Ђя— for the period of time covered. This random one minute change occurred very–— seldom and can most likely be attributed to the calculation round-off rather than–— to the slight change in the elements. It was determined that the normal weekly –— update of the charlie elements is quite sufficient for calculating vulnerability–—єL times and satellite countermeasures at least with the present space order of battle.–— Actually there was not significant change i++Ђя–— 202048Z Dec 82 in addition to the DIA document (Reconnaissance) Surveillance Space–— Systems-USSR (U) DST-1480S-023=82=SA0, 12 Feb 82 the FOV used by the ship was–— determined to have an FOV area closer to the present intelligence asessment that–— the NAVSPASUR suggested FOV area.–—–— (C) By using the RECSAT Program to calculate the orbit height of the–— BOGUS satellites used during OS and information resident in N5, it was determined–— ++Ђя0NM to 500NM, a 500/0 was inserted. The–— program inserted a 500/500. To correct this discrepancy one line of code had to –— be changed (the "go to" address of an "if" test was in error by a "+1" in the ten's–— digit).–—–— (b) (U) After completing the input of position data the program asks–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ you if the data is correct. If an error is discovered you are to depress 1-Return.–—++Ђяogram frequently fails to print the last page of satellite–— vulnerability windows safe times when there is little (i.e., three to five lines) data.–— It displays the data then immediately blanks out (with a full screen flash) and initiates–— display of the next page of data.–—–— (d) (C) The program will not calculate the correct vulnerabilities–— using June dates. May 32, 33, 34, etc. had to be inserted in both the charlie–— ++Ђяn the vulnerability windows throughout–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ the exercise, no matter which elements were used.–—–— (S) During the conduct of the comparison study it ws discovered that–— the Field of View (FOV) used for the Category 3 threat satellites provided–— within the program by NAVSPASUR is different from the FOV used by the ship.–— After review of the messages NISC 0400-2Z Nov 83, NISC 1511529Z Jul 82, and NISC++Ђя that the charlie elements provided by NAVSPASUR for the RORSATS were in error–— in both height and timing between both orbits. The orbits NAVSPASUR chose were for –— EORSATs not RORSATs.–—–— (U) The following is a summary of the TEK 4052 RECSAT computer program–— problems noted during the exercise.–—–— (a) (s) The FOV default capability did not work properly. If an FOV–— had to be changed for instance from 100++Ђя It should recycle back to the previous entry. The program actually inserts the–— incorrect data as the start point for that leg then asks you to re-enter the same–— parameters, therefore the beginning and end date/position are the same. This problem–— requires the operator to reinitialize the program and start over again. This problem–— arose when entering DTG and PIM coordinates for leg two or greater.–—–— (c) (U) The pr+,Ђя elements and PIM DTG fields, otherwise the data would not correlate with the NIPs–— data.–—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Hџ џ_Pџ џ_ џ џ_9џ џ_0џ џ_2џ џ_0џ џ_ џ џ_aџ џ_nџ џ_dџ џ_ џ џ_Dџ џ_eџ џ_cџ џ_iџ џ_sџ џ_iџ џ_oџ џ_nџ џ_ џ џ_Aџ џ_iџ џ_dџ џ_sџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (S) CCG-8 has an HP 9020 system and is using it to generate/provide tactical–— decision aids. The system software includes programs mostly developed by CCG-8 with–— some TAC/D&E, NOSC, and other commands',+,Ђя programs development support. The–— philosophy is not to reinvent the wheel but to use algorithms already developed and meld–— them into a useable system to support the decision making process of the Commander.–— One of the major uses of the system is for the determination of surface/subsurface search–— areas. The unit is also used to develop Combat Air Patrol (CAP) positions and to track–— Bears. Satellite vulnerability, remote terminals, and status boards ar,,Ђяuring discussions relating to the HP 9020 decision aid, it was stated–— that the strength and effectiveness of this program results from the fact that–— it is being bought by and for the group of people who will be and are applying–— it in the same tactical environment within which they are developing it. The –— program is not one brought in from/by a Lab and ordered into place by "HQ" or–— "FLEET" but one that is growing up out of the minds that CCG-8 is using t,,Ђяup some acoustical contacts on the –— GATO and a V-II submarine. As mentioned in prior reports, the "eye" was one of –— the best sensors and it really improved the contact reporting rate. External–— sources had indicated that a possible V-II submarine was near the TF during the workups–— in the VACAPES area, however there were few possible submarine contacts reported–— until the V-II periscope were visually sighted. After the sightings the ASW picture –— ,,Ђяter her periscopes were sighted but it should be noted that the TF–— was unable to maintain contact on the GATO. This was also true even after she–— fired green flares indicating a torpedo/missle attack. It is estimated that she–— manuevered astern of the TF where the ASW capability was the weakest. –—–— (S) Standard delousing procedures, such as laying a sonobuoy barrier and–— having the ship drive through it, were used regularly but were not effec,,Ђяe being–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ incoorporated. Presently it is envisioned that automtic data entry systems such as–— those from NTDS, will not be incorporated. However, the system could interface with the–— TFCC/FDDS or a similar system for maintaining the data base used by the various–—єL computer programs. CCG-8's evolutionary development of the system is resulting in a–— very effective decision aid.–—–— (U) D,,Ђяo solve–— the problems encountered during each deployment, both real and exercise.–—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Aџ џ_Sџ џ_Wџ џ_ џ џ_Sџ џ_uџ џ_mџ џ_mџ џ_aџ џ_rџ џ_yџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (S) ASW was difficult throughout the exercise especially in the VACAPES–— area. The acoustics did improve after the workups in the VACAPES area and–— as the effects of the Gulf Stream dimished, resulting in improved ASW capability.–— As the TF moved east we were able to pick ,,Ђя was more active because "possible contacts" were being reported and the acoustical–— environment was improving. It seems that everyone knew a target was in the area–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ so they prosecuted the "possible targets" more enthusiastically. The GATO as an–— ORANGE Unit was able to avoid being targeted by the TF and attacked the HMS–— HERMES, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. The GATO was–— targeted af,-Ђяtive–— in isolating any submarine trailers. During one of the tactics meetings, –— held nightly, a new delousing scheme was developed and critiqued by a recent–— submarine CO and the Staff. Unfortunately it was not tried due to circumstances–— beyond our control.–—–— (S) During the OS Exercise, it was estimated that up to six real world–— submarines performed surveillance of the TF. The possible submarines–— encountered were two Victor-,-Ђя II's, on Foxtrot, one Echo II and one or two –— Charlie SSGNs. V-II periscopes were sighted a few times and the Foxtrot–— was also sighted transiting on the surface. During the OS Exercise numerous–— sinkers and periscope feathers were sighted but not equated to a hull–— number.–—–— (S) The A3 buoy was deployed during both UE/OS. During the UE Exercise–— the system was not very effective, largely due to the positions where the–— buoy --Ђя џ_Wџ џ_ џ џ_Sџ џ_uџ џ_mџ џ_mџ џ_aџ џ_rџ џ_yџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (S) The two AGIs encountered during the workup phase for the exercise–— and the continued surveillance by the SSV 512 was expected. It was somewhat–—єL of a suprise that up to eight non-combatants did perform surveillance of the–— TF during the UE/OS Exercises. The ships were four AGIs (SSV 512, 514, 506–— and the TRAVERSE), two AGORs (PERSEY and KRUZENSHTERN), one AOR (DNESTR)–— and brie--Ђяatant–— to perform surveillance of the TF was the KRESTA II, CG 681. She was only in–— the area for a few days passing very close to the JFK before continuing her–— transit to the west coast of Africa. –—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Aџ џ_Aџ џ_Wџ џ_ џ џ_Sџ џ_uџ џ_mџ џ_mџ џ_aџ џ_rџ џ_yџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (S) The BEARS flew RECCE missions against the TF five times. The first–— two occurred in the VACAPES area on 17 and 31 May 83. During the transit phase–--Ђя b. (S) The return of the BEAR "Fs" to Norflt on 30 May 83 would have had –— a CPA to the TF of approximately 200NM if the TF was able to maintain PIM.–—–— c. (S) On 3 June 83, the CPA of the BEARS to TF over 100NM but close–— observation was still maintained.–—–— d. (S) The 6 June 83, RECCE near the Azores was over a 600NM flight–— resulting in only two hours of surveillance. This is 1000 miles beyond their–— no--Ђяwas deployed. During the OS, it provided many more "pos sub" contacts–— and in one case held a pos V-II contact for over six hours at a range in–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ excess of 100nm. The position reported by the A3 System was not held by–— SOSUS, therefore a helo dropped sonobuoy field was deployed, resulting in –— a verification that a pos V-II was in the area as reported by the A3 System.–—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Aџ џ_Sџ џ_Uџ--Ђяfly one SRS (MUSSON). The AGIs, SSV 512 and SSV 506 were the most–— active in the surveillance of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. It is possible that–— two acted as a team with the SSV 512 doing most of the communicating and the SSV 506–— operating in EMCON. It was postulated that the SSV 512 was also used as a sub-–— marine queing platform. The possibility of the AGIs being used as a platform–— to test the BEAR BRAMBUE link is also being investigated. The only comb--Ђя— of UE two BEAR "Fs" and two BEAR "Ds" departed Cuba for Norflt on 30 May and–— 3 June respectively. Two BEAR "Ds" also flew from Luanda to Cuba on 3 June 83.–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ During OS the BEAR "D" RECCE the TF on 6, 8 and 12 June 83. The flights were–— considered routine but a few observations are worth noting.–—–— a. (S) The first RECCE occurred within SONM to 100NM of the east coast.–—–— -.Ђяrmal operational zone.–—–— e. (S) During the 8 June 83 RECCE, one BEAR concentrated on the French CV,–— the FOSH, and her BG. The second BEAR is believed to have taken a position NE–— of the FOSH, out of contact range of the TF, therefore only the one BEAR–— was escorted. The 12 June 83 RECCE was similar to the 8 June 83 RECCE with one –— exception. One BEAR stayed with the JFK BG and the other BEAR was 200NM to –— 350NM west of the JFK..-.Ђя Both BEARS were escorted during this RECCE. DRAMBUE–— was also intercepted during this event.–—–— (џ џ_Cџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Jџ џ_Fџ џ_Kџ џ_ џ џ_Lџ џ_oџ џ_nџ џ_gџ џ_ џ џ_Rџ џ_aџ џ_nџ џ_gџ џ_eџ џ_ џ џ_Sџ џ_tџ џ_rџ џ_iџ џ_kџ џ_eџ џ_ џ џ_oџ џ_nџ џ_ џ џ_tџ џ_hџ џ_eџ џ_ џ џ_Uџ џ_Sџ џ_Sџ џ_ џ џ_Aџ џ_Mџ џ_Eџ џ_Rџ џ_Iџ џ_Cџ џ_Aџ џ_ џ џ_(џ џ_Cџ џ_Vџ џ_ џ џ_6џ џ_6џ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_(џ џ_Uџ џ_Sџ џ_Aџ џ_)џ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (S) On 26 May 83 the JFK was able to determine USA's position by the ..Ђяport–— at Norfolk on 2 June 83, and what type of weather she might encounter. It was–— estimated that the USA could use three basic tracks. The JFK planned to use S-3s–— to search, then A6s to attack. Using the probable tracks developed on the HP 9020–— the second S-3 search located the USA and the A6s made a successful attack at –— approximately 850 miles from the JFK. Chief of Staff, CAPT Don Hay stated that the–— Strike could not have been made witho..Ђя2 the Cuba–— deployed BEAR "Ds" were performing reconnaisance of the task force therefore–— precluding the complete application of ECM. In addition to the BEARS causing–— a diversion of attention, the TF was engaging a strike on the USS AMERICA in a–— passex. During this encounter a B-52 was able to approach within 225NM of the TF–— before being detected and escorted.–—–— (S) The second wave of two B-52s was detected early enough so that chaff..Ђяn.–—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Nџ џ_Oџ џ_Sџ џ_Cџ џ_ џ џ_Sџ џ_yџ џ_sџ џ_tџ џ_eџ џ_mџ џ_sџ џ_ џ џ_Uџ џ_sџ џ_eџ џ_dџ џ_ џ џ_iџ џ_nџ џ_ џ џ_Uџ џ_Eџ џ_/џ џ_Oџ џ_Sџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (C) The UHF relay POD (SATCAT) was flown through out the exercise. It was–— usually double cycled up then down one cycle. Many times it was removed from one–— airplane and attached to another. The POD was used for link coordination, ASW/ASUW–—C C&R net, TTY, and link eleven. The system..ЂяBEAR–— reconnaisance of the USA. Between 26 and 29 May 83, JFK had no updates relating–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ to USA's position because of her EMCON policy. CCG-8 and Staff used the HP 9020–— search and track programs to develop a long range search profile to estimate–— the position of the USA. The staff developed the search profile with only the–— knowledge of locations the USA had occupied on 26 May 83, that she was to be in ..Ђяut the use of the HP 9020 and the programs–— that have been developed for use in mission planning and decision aid.–—–—–—єL B52 Exerice:–—–— (S) The exercise included four B-52s in two waves of two aircraft each that–— flew on TF 419. The B-52s were to detect, classify, and target the JFK.–— The TF was to use chaff, jamming, and deception to help the JFK elude the B-52s.–—–— (S) Prior to Comex and during the first intercept by the B-5..Ђя was–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ deployed against them prior to their being escorted. An EA6B also provided jamming–— from the vicinity of the JFK. The B-52s truned toward and Rџ џ_Eџ џ_Cџ џ_Cџ џ_Eџ џ_'џ џ_Dџ џ_ the BIDDLE before–— performing Rџ џ_Eџ џ_Cџ џ_Cџ џ_Eџ џ_ of the JFK.–—–— (C) Post analysis from the B-52s will have to be completed before any –— evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of the ECM and deceptio./Ђя has been flown nearly 1000 hours and works–— quite well although we noted the following problems:–—–— a. (C) During the first three or four days, linking problems are usually –— encountered. This is attributed to training the new users in the operational–— procedures requried to link with the POD.–—–— b. (C) The POD was installed once between the fuselage and engine on an –— S-3, thereby shadowing the attennae and causing/./Ђя intermitten communications.–—–— c. (U) One transceiver failed and was replaced with the unused channel–— five's transceiver.–—–— d. (U) An input connector to the splitter was cross threaded resulting in–— RFI problems.–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ–— e. (U) Attenuators had to be removed or lowered in value to peak up the–— system.–—–— (S) The IREPS is well rece//Ђя spectrum when not in EMCON Bravo. If LRI were–— used, the cops program would be used to determine the frequency and power levels–— to effect LRI communications (because it is more user oriented and they have a–— WANG System). The prophet is used to validate the convertness of the cops–— frequency and power prediction.–—–—–—єL–— (S) The STADD was deployed on USCG CHASE throughout both of the exercises.–— Preliminary information received indi//ЂяATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ mode and if granted, everything to support the demonstration will be available.–—–— (S) The GPS has been basically inoperative since the start of the exercise.–— The Staff is awaiting the receipt of new program tapes from NOSC. The writer–— suggested that if the tapes were the only thing preventing the use of the GPS, –— then CCG-8 could send a message to NOSC requesting the Stan Miyashiro drop off–— //Ђяlts of this test will have to be–— obtained directly from NRL. NRL's P-3 can simulate some of the threat missiles–— and radars. It offered to simulate these while flying within the TF to provide–— training for the EW operators and to exercise the EW systems. The simulation–— was successful and the oeprators appreciated the training they received.–—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Dџ џ_aџ џ_iџ џ_lџ џ_yџ џ_ џ џ_1џ џ_9џ џ_0џ џ_0џ џ_ џ џ_Tџ џ_aџ џ_cџ џ_tџ џ_iџ џ_cџ џ_sџ џ_ џ//Ђяived and is used daily to calculate and provide–— ducting information and is also used for some vulnerability to threat calculations.–— This data is briefed at the Staff briefings every morning and evening as well as –— transmitted, via message, daily to all the ships in company. The information is–— also included in the flight prebriefs.–—–— (S) The HF prophet and cops programs are used to determine the optimal–— frequency to be used in the HF//Ђяcates that the GATO was lured toward and –— attached the CHASE (052000Z JUN 83). The system is holding up and there seems to–— be no problems with deploying the array with no damage to the cable. (During previous–— exercises two cables were damaged within the first few deployments).–—–— (S) The SIDM is still on track to be deployed on the USS BIDDLE for the–— BALLTOPS Exercise. CCG-8 has requested a waiver to use the SLQ 20 in the active–—”ђ0`@э1@L//Ђя the tapes in London while in transit to meet the USS BIDDLE. The Staff really–— praises the system and with the problems encountered with the SINS lately (60NM to–— 100NM off in position) the GPS would have been invaluable.–—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Nџ џ_Rџ џ_Lџ џ_ џ џ_Pџ џ_-џ џ_3џ џ_ џ џ_Fџ џ_lџ џ_yџ џ_ џ џ_Bџ џ_yџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (S) NRL flew it's P-3 over the TF to measure the differences of SRBOC and–— the NATO SEANAT chaff without IR. Specific resu/0Ђя џ_Mџ џ_eџ џ_eџ џ_tџ џ_iџ џ_nџ џ_gџ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (U) A few of the civilians were offered the opportunity to sit-in and –— participate in a daily tactics meeting held 1900 in the War Room. Beside CCG-8–— Staff, the ship's CO, OPS, CAG and some squadron COs also were invited. During–— the meeting the day's events were reviewed, a weather forecast was briefed, and the–— tactics to be used for upcoming events were discussed. Usually there was a short–— 0/0Ђя brief (5 min) by a member of the group, concerning a subject of general interest.–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ RADM Flatley really stressed brain-storming of ideas and dissemination of information.–— These meetings were very helful in providing an understanding on how a CARGRU–— operates, the objectives to be met, and accomplishments obtained during each phase–— of the exercise.–—–— (џ џ_Uџ џ_)џ џ_ џ џ_Mџ џ_rџ џ_.џ џ_ џ џ_Kџ џ_eџ 00Ђяstems and aircraft capabilities. He also briefed on–— the collection programs FTD is responsible for and how those programs and national–— systems can possibly be of assistance to the Navy. Persons briefed were CCG-8 and –— Staff ships N2, SESS and Supplot Heads, etc! AUGUST PROGRESS REPORT OF VARIABLE OCEAN TASK–—–—–—1. Iџ џ_Nџ џ_Tџ џ_Rџ џ_Oџ џ_Dџ џ_Uџ џ_Cџ џ_Tџ џ_Iџ џ_Oџ џ_Nџ џ_–—–— This report updates the last progress report dated 7 Ju00Ђя83. COMTHIRDFLT plans to provide comments by mid-August. Work will–—continue on the more oceanographically orientated document. This document–—will serve as a data base for the TACMEMO. At present we have no plans to–—distribute the oceanographic document.–—–—3. Pџ џ_Rџ џ_Oџ џ_Gџ џ_Rџ џ_Eџ џ_Sџ џ_Sџ џ_–—–— In the previous progress report it was noted that the strawman oceanographic –—document was reviewed by various commands. It was also indicated that generally–—the document appe00Ђяcipating platforms. The TACMEMO–—is augmented with appendices which define major terms, areas of the ocean in–—the Pacific Theater where subject oceanographic features might be found, a–—detailed example of the procedures described in the body of the report, and–—an annotated bibliography.–—–—–—–—–—єL–—–—–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ–—–—MEMORANDUM–—–—From: C. H. Sturtevant, Code 624–—To: J. R. Beauchane, Code 1801–—–—Subj: Progress Report of Variable Oce00Ђяџ_nџ џ_ џ џ_Mџ џ_iџ џ_lџ џ_lџ џ_eџ џ_rџ џ_ џ џ_(џ џ_Fџ џ_Tџ џ_Dџ џ_ џ џ_Wџ џ_rџ џ_iџ џ_gџ џ_hџ џ_tџ џ_-џ џ_Pџ џ_aџ џ_tџ џ_tџ џ_eџ џ_rџ џ_sџ џ_oџ џ_nџ џ_ џ џ_Aџ џ_Fџ џ_Bџ џ_)џ џ_:џ џ_–—–— (U) Mr. Miller assisted in evaluating the C3CM support effort by providing–— new data and information as well as insights into threat capability. He assisted–— in maintaining the data bases and interfaced with the Staff. During the exercise–— he was briefed on the ship's sy00Ђяly 1983.–—–—2. Pџ џ_Lџ џ_Aџ џ_Nџ џ_Sџ џ_–—–— During June and early July efforts were concentrated on writing the Battle–—Group Operations in a Variable Ocean TACMEMO. The document as being written–—will set out procedures for ASWC in handling various aspects of acoustic data.–—These data include not only historical but the data collected in real time.–—A draft of the TACMEMO was briefed to Third Fleet during the week of 11 July–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ1900Ђяared to be addressing the right topics but may be diffuclt to–—implement; therefore this TACMEMO-type approach was initiated. The TACMEMO–—consists of an introduction which describes the objective of the TACMEMO and–—highlights the needs for the TACMEMO. The second section describes procedures–—for describing ocean parameters and their impact on acoustic sensors. The thrust–—of this section is to describe various data available to ASWC, how he should use–—the data, and what he is to pass to parti01Ђяan Task–—–—Encl: (1) August Progress Report of Variable Ocean Task–—–—1. Enclosure (1) is being submitted as required.–—–—–—–—–—–—–— C. H. STURTEVANT–—–—Copy to:–—62–—є?5% aloha–—SESSION 1 CLOSED TO 0010,0–—#loCATION 9–—#caLL abc–—# CALL COMPLETED TO 0ABC,1–—”ђ0`@э1@LATэ2??????э3Hэ4XJ@[@@@э8@p@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ–—–—4.2 BSD UNIX (nosc)–—––—–login: south–—Password:–—What ANI? (dmx): –—Last login: Wed Apr 25 08:44:24111Ђяthat have been developed for use in mission—™planning and the CCG-8 decision aids.——™10.™™„B52 Exercise (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The exercise included four B-52s in two waves of two aircraft each that—™flew on TF 419. The B-52s were to detect, classify, and target the JFK.—™The TF was to use chaff, jamming, and deception to help the JFK elude the B-52s.——™™b.™(S)™Prior to Comex, and during the first intercept by the B-52, is the Cuba—™deployed BEAR "Ds" were performing reconnaissance of the task force which21Ђяion by the BEAR reconnaissance of the USA. Between 26 and 29 May 83, JFK had no—™updates relating to USA's position because of her EMCON status. CCG-8 and the Staff—™used the HP 9020 "search and track" programs to develop a long range search profile to—™estimate the position of the USA. The staff developed the "search profile" with only the—™knowledge of: a) location the USA had occupied on 26 May 83, b) that she was to be in—™port at Norfolk on 2 June 83, and c) what type of weather she could16Ђяand RECCE'D the BIDDLE before—™performing RECCE of the JFK.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™d.™(C)™Post analysis of information from the B-52s will have to be completed—™before any evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of the ECM and deception used by—™the TF.——™11.™„NOSC Systems Used in UE/OS (U)…——™™a.™(C)™The UHF relay POD (SATCAT) was flown throughout the exercise on S-3s—™and A6s. It was usually double cycled up th11Ђя—™precluded the complete application of ECM. In addition to the BEARS causing—™a diversion of attention, the TF was engaging a strike on the USS AMERICA in a—™PASSEX. During this encounter a B-52 was able to approach within 225NM of the TF—™before being detected and escorted.——™™c.™(S)™The second wave of two B-52s was detected early enough so that chaff was—™deployed against them prior to their being escorted. An EA6B also provided jamming—™from the vicinity of the JFK. The B-52s turned toward 11Ђя expect to encounter.—™It was evaluated that the USA could use any of three basic tracks. The JFK planned to—™use the S-3s aircract for the search, then attached with A6 aircraft. Using the probable—™tracks developed on the HP 9020 the second S-3 search plan resulted in the location of the—™USA and the A6s made a successful attack at approximately 850 miles from the JFK.—™Chief of Staff, CAPT Don Hay stated that the Strike could not have been made without—™the use of the HP 9020 and the programs 21ЂяR "Ds" also flew from Luanda to Cuba on 3 June 83.—™During OS the BEAR "D" flow RECCE on the TF on 6, 8 and 12 June 83. The flights were—™considered routine but a few observations are worth noting.——™™™™(1)™(S)™The first RECCE occurred within 80NM to 100NM of the east coast.——™™™™(2)™(S)™The return of the BEAR "Fs" to Norflt on 30 May 83 would have had —™a CPA of approximately 200NM to the TF if the TF was able to maintain the PIM.——™™™™(3)™(S)™On 3 June 83, the CPA of the BEARS to the TF was over40Ђяetter than the—™systems used in most SESSs. The CCSC and SKR-7 were being evaluated by OPTEVFOR.—™Questions regarding these systems should be directed to OPTEVFOR, LCDR R. Stewart.——™13.™„NRL P-3 Fly By (U)…——™™a.™(S)™NRL flew it's P-3 over the TF to measure the differences of SRBOC and—™the NATO SEANAT chaff without IR. Specific results of this test will have to be—™obtained directly from NRL. NRL's P-3 has the capability to simulate some of the threat—™missiles and radars and offered to simul12Ђя 500NM but—™close observation was still maintained.——™™™™(4)™(S)™The 6 June 83, RECCE conducted near the Azores was over a—™6000NM round trip flight resulting in only two hours of surveillance. —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™™™(5)™(S)™During the 8 June 83 RECCE, one BEAR concentrated on the French—™CV, the FOCH, and her BG. The second BEAR is believed to have taken a position NE—™of the FOSH, out of contact range of the TF, therefore only the one BEAR—™was 232Ђя—™only combatant to perform surveillance of the TF was the KRESTA II, CG 681. She was—™only in the area for a few days passing very close to the JFK before continuing her—™transit to the west coast of Africa. ——™8.™„AAW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The BEARS flew RECCE missions against the TF five times. The first—™two occurred in the VACAPES area on 17 and 31 May 83. During the transit phase—™of UE two BEAR "Fs" and two BEAR "Ds" departed Cuba for Norflt on 30 May and—™3 June respectively. Two BEA22ЂяR "Ds" also flew from Luanda to Cuba on 3 June 83.—™During OS the BEAR "D" flow RECCE on the TF on 6, 8 and 12 June 83. The flights were—™considered routine but a few observations are worth noting.——™™™™(1)™(S)™The first RECCE occurred within 80NM to 100NM of the east coast.——™™™™(2)™(S)™The return of the BEAR "Fs" to Norflt on 30 May 83 would have had —™a CPA (of approximately 200NM) to the TF if the TF was able to maintain the PIM.——™™™™(3)™(S)™On 3 June 83, the CPA of the BEARS to the TF was ov21Ђяescorted by the JOHN F. KENNEDY's F-14s. The 12 June 83 RECCE was similar to—™the 8 June 83 RECCE with one exception. One BEAR stayed with the JFK BG and the—™other BEAR was 200NM to 350NM west of the JFK. Both BEARS were escorted during—™this RECCE. DRAMBUIE was also intercepted during this event (possible test to the—™AGI).——™9.™„USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (JFK) Long Range Strike on the USS AMERICA (CV 66)…—™™„(USA) (C)…——™™a.™(S)™On 26 May 83 the JFK was able to determine USS AMERICA's (USA)—™posit22Ђяer 500NM but—™close observation was still maintained.——™™™™(4)™(S)™The 6 June 83, RECCE conducted near the Azores was over a—™6000NM round trip flight resulting in only two hours of surveillance. —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™™™(5)™(S)™During the 8 June 83 RECCE, one BEAR concentrated on the French—™CV, the FOCH, and her BG. The second BEAR is believed to have taken a position NE—™of the FOSH, out of contact range of the TF, therefore only the one BEAR—™was 22ЂяR "Ds" also flew from Luanda to Cuba on 3 June 83.—™During OS the BEAR "D" flow RECCE on the TF on 6, 8 and 12 June 83. The flights were—™considered routine but a few observations are worth noting.——™™™™(1)™(S)™The first RECCE occurred within 80NM to 100NM of the east coast.——™™™™(2)™(S)™The return of the BEAR "Fs" to Norflt on 30 May 83 would have had —™a CPA (of approximately 200NM) to the TF if the TF was able to maintain the PIM.——™™™™(3)™(S)™On 3 June 83, the CPA of the BEARS to the TF was ov32Ђя—™only combatant to perform surveillance of the TF was the KRESTA II, CG 681. She was—™only in the area for a few days passing very close to the JFK before continuing her—™transit to the west coast of Africa. ——™8.™„AAW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The BEARS flew RECCE missions against the TF five times. The first—™two occurred in the VACAPES area on 17 and 31 May 83. During the transit phase—™of UE two BEAR "Fs" and two BEAR "Ds" departed Cuba for Norflt on 30 May and—™3 June respectively. Two BEA22Ђяer 500NM but—™close observation was still maintained.——™™™™(4)™(S)™The 6 June 83, RECCE conducted near the Azores was over a—™6000NM round trip flight resulting in only two hours of surveillance. —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™™™(5)™(S)™During the 8 June 83 RECCE, one BEAR concentrated on the French—™CV, the FOCH, and her BG. The second BEAR is believed to have taken a position NE—™of the FOSH, out of contact range of the TF, therefore only the one BEAR—™was 21Ђяescorted by the JOHN F. KENNEDY's F-14s. The 12 June 83 RECCE was similar to—™the 8 June 83 RECCE with one exception. One BEAR stayed with the JFK BG and the—™other BEAR was 200NM to 350NM west of the JFK. Both BEARS were escorted during—™this RECCE. DRAMBUIE was also intercepted during this event (possible test to the—™AGI).——™9.™„USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (JFK) Long Range Strike on the USS AMERICA (CV 66)…—™™„(USA) (C)…——™™a.™(S)™On 26 May 83 the JFK was able to determine USS AMERICA's (USA)—™posit334Ђяt a pos V-II was in the area comfirming the—™report by the Aќ3њ System.——™7.™„ASUW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The two AGIs encountered during the workup phase for the exercise—™and the continued surveillance by the SSV 512 was expected. It was somewhat—ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™of a suprise that up to eight non-combatants did perform surveillance of the—™TF during the UE/OS Exercises. The ships were four AGIs (SSV 512, 514, 506—™and the TRAVER), two AGORs (PERSEY and KRUZENSHTERN), 63Ђя@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™d.™(S)™The Advance Autonomous Array (Aќ3њ) buoy was deployed during both UE/OS.—™During the UE Exercise the system was not very effective, largely due to the positions—™where the buoy was deployed. During the OS, it provided many more "pos sub" contacts—™and in one case held a pos V-II contact for over six hours at a range in excess of 100nm.—™The position reported by the Aќ3њ System was not held by SOSUS, therefore a helo deployed—™a sonobuoy field, resulting in a verification tha34Ђяnly—™combatant to perform surveillance of the TF was the KRESTA II, CG 681. She was only in—™the area for a few days passing very close to the JFK before continuing her—™transit to the west coast of Africa. ——™8.™(„U) AAW Summary:…——™™a.™(S)™The BEARS flew RECCE missions against the TF five times. The first—™two occurred in the VACAPES area on 17 and 31 May 83. During the transit phase—™of UE two BEAR "Fs" and two BEAR "Ds" departed Cuba for Norflt on 30 May and—™3 June respectively. Two BEAR32Ђя one AOR (DNESTR)—™and briefly one SRS (MUSSON). The AGIs, SSV 512 and SSV 506 were the most—™active in the surveillance of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. It is possible that—™two acted as a team with the SSV 512 doing most of the communicating and the SSV 506—™operating in EMCON. It was postulated that the SSV 512 was also used as a sub-—™marine queueing platform. The possibility of the AGIs being used as a platform—™to test the BEAR DRAMBUIE link is also being investigated by the INTEL staffs. The33Ђяt a pos V-II was in the area comfirming the—™report by the Aќ3њ System.——™7.™„ASUW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The two AGIs encountered during the workup phase for the exercise—™and the continued surveillance by the SSV 512 was expected. It was somewhat—ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™of a surprise that up to eight non-combatants did perform surveillance of the—™TF during the UE/OS Exercises. The ships were four AGIs (SSV 512, 514, 506—™and the TRAVER), two AGORs (PERSEY and KRUZENSHTERN),33Ђяt a pos V-II was in the area comfirming the—™report by the Aќ3њ System.——™7.™(„U) ASUW Summary:…——™™a.™(S)™The two AGIs encountered during the workup phase for the exercise—™and the continued surveillance by the SSV 512 was expected. It was somewhat—ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™of a suprise that up to eight non-combatants did perform surveillance of the—™TF during the UE/OS Exercises. The ships were four AGIs (SSV 512, 514, 506—™and the TRAVER), two AGORs (PERSEY and KRUZENSHTERN),33Ђя one AOR (DNESTR)—™and briefly one SRS (MUSSON). The AGIs, SSV 512 and SSV 506 were the most—™active in the surveillance of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. It is possible that—™two acted as a team with the SSV 512 doing most of the communicating and the SSV 506—™operating in EMCON. It was postulated that the SSV 512 was also used as a sub-—™marine queing platform. The possibility of the AGIs being used as a platform—™to test the BEAR PRAMBUIE link is also being investigated by the INTEL staffs. The o32Ђя one AOR (DNESTR)—™and briefly one SRS (MUSSON). The AGIs, SSV 512 and SSV 506 were the most—™active in the surveillance of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. It is possible that—™two acted as a team with the SSV 512 doing most of the communicating and the SSV 506—™operating in EMCON. It was postulated that the SSV 512 was also used as a sub-—™marine queuling platform. The possibility of the AGIs being used as a platform—™to test the BEAR DRAMBUIE link is also being investigated by the INTEL staffs. The434Ђя "Ds" also flew from Luanda to Cuba on 3 June 83.—™During OS the BEAR "D" flow RECCE on the TF on 6, 8 and 12 June 83. The flights were—™considered routine but a few observations are worth noting.——™™™™1.™(S)™The first RECCE occurred within 80NM to 100NM of the east coast.——™™™™2.™(S)™The return of the BEAR "Fs" to Norflt on 30 May 83 would have had —™a CPA (of approximately 200NM) to the TF if the TF was able to maintain the PIM.——™™™™3.™(S)™On 3 June 83, the CPA of the BEARS to the TF was over 564Ђяthen CCG-8 could send a message to NOSC requesting the STAN—™MIYASHIRO drop off the tapes in London while in transit to meet the USS BIDDLE. The—™Staff really praises the system and with the problems encountered with the SINS lately—™(60NM to 100NM off in position) the GPS would have been invaluable.—™—™12.™„SESS Operations (U)…——™During this deployment the SESS was outfitted with some programmable Watkins Johnson—™(WJ) Receivers, Sony Wide Band Receivers, a prototype Automatic CW Recognition/—™En41Ђяcoder Device, a Cryptologic Combat Support Console (CCSC) and the SKR-7. It should—™be noted that many ships with SESS are buying the Sony (ICF 2000) Receivers because the—™standard receivers are manually tuned and man intensive to operate. The SESS crew—™stated that because of the WJ's and Sony receivers they had the most automated space,—™aboard a ship in the Navy. Interestingly enough, these receivers are relatively—™inexpensive and are not the state-of-the-art receivers but are a magnitude b44ЂяDs" also flew from Luanda to Cuba on 3 June 83.—™During OS the BEAR "D" flow RECCE on the TF on 6, 8 and 12 June 83. The flights were—™considered routine but a few observations are worth noting.——™™™™1.™(S)™The first RECCE occurred within 80NM to 100NM of the east coast.——™™™™2.™(S)™The return of the BEAR "Fs" to Norflt on 30 May 83 would have had —™a CPA (of approximately 200NM) to the TF if the TF was able to maintain the PIM.——™™™™3.™(S)™On 3 June 83, the CPA of the BEARS to the TF was over 50044ЂяNM but—™close observation was still maintained.——™™™™4.™(S)™The 6 June 83, RECCE conducted near the Azores was over a—™6000NM round trip flight resulting in only two hours of surveillance. —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™™™5.™(S)™During the 8 June 83 RECCE, one BEAR concentrated on the French—™CV, the FOCH, and her BG. The second BEAR is believed to have taken a position NE—™of the FOSH, out of contact range of the TF, therefore only the one BEAR—™was escort34Ђяone AOR (DNESTR)—™and briefly one SRS (MUSSON). The AGIs, SSV 512 and SSV 506 were the most—™active in the surveillance of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. It is possible that—™two acted as a team with the SSV 512 doing most of the communicating and the SSV 506—™operating in EMCON. It was postulated that the SSV 512 was also used as a sub-—™marine queing platform. The possibility of the AGIs being used as a platform—™to test the BEAR DRAMBUIE link is also being investigated by the INTEL staffs. The—™o45Ђяed by the JOHN F. KENNEDY's F-14s. The 12 June 83 RECCE was similar to—™the 8 June 83 RECCE with one exception. One BEAR stayed with the JFK BG and the—™other BEAR was 200NM to 350NM west of the JFK. Both BEARS were escorted during—™this RECCE. DRAMBUIE was also intercepted during this event (possible test to the—™AGI).——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™9.™„USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (JFK) Long Range Strike on the USS AMERICA (CV 66)…—™™„(USA) (C)…——™™a.™(S)™On 26 May 83 the JFK was able to44Ђяnly combatant to perform surveillance of the TF was the KRESTA II, CG 681. She was—™only in the area for a few days passing very close to the JFK before continuing her—™transit to the west coast of Africa. ——™8.™„AAW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The BEARS flew RECCE missions against the TF five times. The first—™two occurred in the VACAPES area on 17 and 31 May 83. During the transit phase—™of UE two BEAR "Fs" and two BEAR "Ds" departed Cuba for Norflt on 30 May and—™3 June respectively. Two BEAR "556Ђя the JFK. The B-52s truned toward and RECCE'D the BIDDLE before—™performing RECCE of the JFK.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™d.™(C)™Post analysis of information from the B-52s will have to be completed—™before any evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of the ECM and deception used by—™the TF.——™11.™„NOSC Systems Used in UE/OS (U)…——™™a.™(C)™The UHF relay POD (SATCAT) was flown throughout the exercise on S-3s—™and A6s. It was usually double cycled up th58Ђяas estimated that up to six real world—™submarines performed surveillance of the TF. The possible submarines—™encountered were two Victor II's, one Foxtrot, (Attachment 4) one Echo II and one or two —™Charlie SSGNs (Attachment 5). V-II and CHARLIE SSGN periscopes were sighted and—™the Foxtrot was also sighted while transiting on the surface. During the OS Exercise—™numerous sinkers and periscope feathers were also sighted but were not equated to a hull—™number.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A????45Ђя determine USS AMERICA's (USA)—™position by the BEAR reconnaisance of the USA. Between 26 and 29 May 83, JFK had no—™updates relating to USA's position because of her EMCON status. CCG-8 and the Staff—™used the HP 9020 "search and track" programs to develop a long range search profile to—™estimate the position of the USA. The staff developed the "search profile" with only the—™knowledge of: a) location the USA had occupied on 26 May 83, b) that she was to be in—™port at Norfolk on 2 June 83, a55Ђяconnaisance of the task force which—™precluded the complete application of ECM. In addition to the BEARS causing—™a diversion of attention, the TF was engaging a strike on the USS AMERICA in a—™PASSEX. During this encounter a B-52 was able to approach within 225NM of the TF—™before being detected and escorted.——™™c.™(S)™The second wave of two B-52s was detected early enough so that chaff was—™deployed against them prior to their being escorted. An EA6B also provided jamming—™from the vicinity of65ЂяTF where the ASW coverage was the weakest.——™™b.™(S)™Standard delousing procedures, such as laying a sonobuoy barrier and—™having the ship drive through it, were used regularly but were not effective—™in detecting any submarine trailers. During one of the nightly tactics meetings, —™held nightly, a new delousing scheme was developed and critiqued by a recent—™submarine CO and the Staff. Unfortunately it was not employed due to equipment—™and time contraints.——™™c.™(S)™During the OS Exercise, it w55Ђяnd c) what type of weather she could expect to encounter.—™It was evaluated that the USA could use any of three basic tracks. The JFK planned to—™use the S-3s aircract for the search, then attached with A6 aircraft. Using the probable—™tracks developed on the HP 9020 the second S-3 search plan resulted in the location of the—™USA and the A6s made a successful attack at approximately 850 miles from the JFK.—™Chief of Staff, CAPT Don Hay stated that the Strike could not have been made without—™the 55Ђяuse of the HP 9020 and the programs that have been developed for use in mission—™planning and the CCG-8 decision aids.——™10.™™„B52 Exercise (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The exercise included four B-52s in two waves of two aircraft each that—™flew on TF 419. The B-52s were to detect, classify, and target the JFK.—™The TF was to use chaff, jamming, and deception to help the JFK elude the B-52s.——™™b.™(S)™Prior to Comex, and during the first intercept by the B-52, is the Cuba—™deployed BEAR "Ds" were performing re77ЂяCG656Ђяen down one cycle. Many times it was—™removed from one airplane and attached to another with no maintenance performed. The—™POD was used for link coordination, ASW/ASUW C&R net, TTY, and link eleven relay.—™The system has been flown nearly 1000 hours and works quite well although the following—™problems were noted:——™™™™(1)™(C)™During the first three or four days, linking problems were —™encountered. This is attributed to training the new users in the operational—™procedures required to link wit56Ђяen down one cycle. Many times it was—™removed from one airplane and attached to another with no maintenance performed. The—™POD was used for link coordination, ASW/ASUW C&R net, TTY, and link eleven relay.—™The system has been flown nearly 1000 hours and works quite well although the following—™problems were noted:——™™™™1.™(C)™During the first three or four days, linking problems were —™encountered. This is attributed to training the new users in the operational—™procedures required to link with6EЂяnot in EMCON Bravo. If LRI were—™used, the COPS program would be used to determine the frequency and power levels—™to effect LRI communications. The PROPHET System is used to validate the convertness—™of the cops frequency and power prediction. (The COPS is primarily used because it is—™more user oriented and the staff has a dedicated WANG System). —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ—™™d.™(S)™The Ship Towed Acoustic Deception Device (STADD) was deployed on USCG67Ђяh the POD.——™™™™(2)™(C)™The POD was installed once between the fuselage and the engine on—™an S-3, thereby shadowing the antennae and causing intermittent communications.——™™™™(3)™(U)™One transceiver failed and was replaced with the unused transceiver—™(Channel #5.)——™™™™(4)™(U)™An input connector to the splitter was inadvertently cross threaded—™resulting in RFI problems.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™™™™(5)™(U)™Attenuators had to be removed or lowered in value to peak up the—™syste66Ђя the POD.——™™™™2.™(C)™The POD was installed once between the fuselage and the engine on—™an S-3, thereby shadowing the antennae and causing intermittant communications.——™™™™3.™(U)™One transceiver failed and was replaced with the unused traansceiver—™(Channel #5.)——™™™™4.™(U)™An input connector to the splitter was inadvertantly cross threaded—™resulting in RFI problems.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™™™™5.™(U)™Attenuators had to be removed or lowered in value to peak up the—™system.——66Ђя™™b.™(S)™The IREPS is well received and is used daily to calculate and provide—™ducting information. It is also used for some vulnerability to threat calculations.—™This data is presented at the Staff briefings every morning and evening as well as —™transmitted, via daily message, to all the ships in company. The information is—™also included in the AIRCREN flight briefings.——™™c.™(S)™The HF PROPHET and COPS programs are used to determine the optimal—™frequency to be used in the HF spectrum when 75Ђяs" more enthusiastically. The—™GATO when acting as an ORANGE Unit was able to avoid being targeted by the TF and—™attacked the HMS HERMES, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.—™The GATO was targeted after her periscopes were sighted (Attachment 2) but it should be—™noted that the TF was unable to maintain contact on the GATO after she submerged. This—™was also true even after she fired green flares indicating a torpedo/missile attack. It is—™believed that she manuevered astern of the 74ЂяON 32 in USS—™BIDDLE requested a waiver to use the SLQ-20 in the active mode during this follow-on—™exercise but was turned down by CINCLANTFLT. The demonstration test will be–™accomplished without this capability.——™™f.™(S)™The Global Positioning System (GPS) deployed on the JFK has been basically—™inoperative since the start of the exercise. The Staff is awaiting receipt of new program—™tapes from NOSC. The writer suggested that if the tapes were the only thing preventing—™the use of the GPS, 767Ђя—™CHASE throughout both of the exercises. Preliminary information received indicates that—™the GATO was lured toward and attacked the CHASE, (CHASE 052000Z JUN 83). The—™system is holding up and there appears to be no further cable problems when deploying the—™array . (During previous exercises two cables were damaged during first few—™deployments.)——™™e.™(S)™The Ship Identification Demonstration Model (SIDM) is still on track to be—™deployed on the USS BIDDLE for the BALTOPS Exercise. COMDESR96Ђяes had indicated that a—™possible V-II submarine was near the TF during the workups in the VACAPES area,—™however there were only a few "possible submarine" contacts reported until the V-II—™periscope were visually sighted (Attachment 1). After the sightings the ASW picture —™was more active because "possible submarine contacts" were being reported and the—™acoustical environment was improving. It seems that everyone knew a target was in the—™area so they prosecuted the "possible submarine target77ЂяCG78Ђяuld send a message to NOSC requesting the STAN—™MIYASHIRO drop off the tapes in London while in transit to meet the USS BIDDLE. The—™Staff really praises the system and with the problems encountered with the SINS lately—™(60NM to 100NM off in position) the GPS would have been invaluable.—™—™12.™„SESS Operations (U)…——™During this deployment the SESS was outfitted with some programmable Watkins Johnson—™(WJ) Receivers, Sony Wide Band Receivers, a prototype Automatic CW Recognition/—™Encoder Device,77Ђяhen not in EMCON Bravo. If LRI were—™used, the COPS program would be used to determine the frequency and power levels—™to effect LRI communications. The PROPHET System is used to validate the convertness—™of the cops frequency and power prediction. (The COPS is primarily used because it is—™more user oriented and the staff has a dedicated WANG System). —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ—™™d.™(S)™The Ship Towed Acoustic Deception Device (STADD) was deployed on US67Ђяm.——™™b.™(S)™The IREPS is well received and is used daily to calculate and provide—™ducting information. It is also used for some vulnerability to threat calculations.—™This data is presented at the Staff briefings every morning and evening as well as —™transmitted, via daily message, to all the ships in company. The information is—™also included in the AIRCREN flight briefings.——™™c.™(S)™The HF PROPHET and COPS programs are used to determine the optimal—™frequency to be used in the HF spectrum w77ЂяON 32 in USS—™BIDDLE requested a waiver to use the SLQ-20 in the active mode during this follow-on—™exercise but was turned down by CINCLANTFLT. The demonstration test will be without—™this capability.——™™f.™(S)™The Global Positioning System (GPS) deployed on the JFK has been basically—™inoperative since the start of the exercise. The Staff is awaiting receipt of new program—™tapes from NOSC. The writer suggested that if the tapes were the only thing preventing—™the use of the GPS, then CCG-8 co75Ђяhen not in EMCON Bravo. If LRI were—™used, the COPS program would be used to determine the frequency and power levels—™to effect LRI communications. The PROPHET System is used to validate the convertness—™of the COPS frequency and power prediction. (The COPS is primarily used because it is—™more user oriented and the staff has a dedicated WANG System). —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ—™™d.™(S)™The Ship Towed Acoustic Deception Device (STADD) was deployed on US888Ђяe—™systems used in most SESSs. The CCSC and SKR-7 were being evaluated by OPTEVFOR.—™Questions regarding these systems should be directed to OPTEVFOR, LCDR R. Stewart.——™13.™„NRL P-3 Fly By (U)…——™™a.™(S)™NRL flew it's P-3 over the TF to measure the differences of SRBOC and—™the NATO SEANAT chaff without IR. Specific results of this test will have to be—™obtained directly from NRL. NRL's P-3 has the capability to simulate some of the threat—™missiles and radars and offered to simulate these whi78Ђя a Cryptologic Combat Support Console (CCSC) and the SKR-7. It should—™be noted that many ships with SESS are buying the Sony (ICF 2000) Receivers because the—™standard receivers are manually tuned and man intensive to operate. The SESS crew—™stated that because of the WJ's and Sony receivers they had the most automated space,—™aboard a ship in the Navy. Interestingly enough, these receivers are relatively—™inexpensive and are not the state-of-the-art receivers but are a magnitude better than th88Ђяle flying within the TF to provide—™training for the EW operators and to exercise the EW systems. The simulation—™was successful and the operators appreciated the training they received.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™14.™„Daily 1900 Tactics Meeting (U)…——™™a.™(U)™ The writer was afforded the opportunity to sit-in and participate in a daily—™tactics meeting held at 1900 in the War Room. Participants were CCG-8/Staff, the ship's—™CO, OPS, CAG and some squadron 9:Ђяram results from the fact that—™it is being procured/leased for the group of people who will be and are applying—™it in the same tactical environment within which they are developing it. The —™program is not one brought in from/by a Lab and ordered into place by the "Fleet HQ"—™but one that is growing up out of the minds that CCG-8 is using to solve—™the problems encountered during each deployment, both real and exercise.——™6.™„ASW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™ASW was difficult throughout the exercise e88ЂяCOs. During the meeting the day's events were—™reviewed, a weather forecast was briefed, and the tactics to be used for upcoming events—™were discussed. Usually there was a short brief (5 min) by a member of the group—™concerning a subject of general interest. RADM Flatley really stressed brainstorming of—™ideas and dissemination of information. These meetings were very helful in providing an—™understanding on how a CARGRU operates, the objectives to be met, and—™accomplishments obtained during88Ђя each phase of the exercise.——™15.™„Mr. Ken Miller (FTD Wright-Patterson AFB) (U)…——™™a.™(U)™Mr. Miller assisted in evaluating the Cќ3њCM support effort by providing—™new threat data and information as well as insights into threat capability. He assisted—™in maintaining the data bases and interfaced with the Staff. During the exercise—™he was briefed on the ship's systems and aircraft capabilities. He also briefed on—™the collection programs FTD is responsible for and how those programs and nati88Ђяonal—™systems can possibly be of assistance to the Navy. Persons briefed were—™COMSECONDFLT, CCG-8 and their Staff, both the JFK and USS MT WHITNEY — ™ships N2, SESS and Supplot Heads, etc!73Ђя?э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@9:9Ђяs already developed and meld–™them into a useable system to support the decision making process of the Commander.—™One of the major uses of the system is for the determination of surface/subsurface search—™areas. The system is also used to develop Combat Air Patrol (CAP) positions and to track—™the Bear aircraft. Satellite vulnerability, remote terminals, and status boards are also–™being incorporated into the system. Presently there are not plans for automtic data–™entry systems such as those 9:Ђяram results from the fact that—™it is being procured/leased for the group of people who will be and are applying—™it in the same tactical environment within which they are developing it. The —™program is not one brought in from/by a Lab and ordered into place by the "Fleet HQ"—™but one that is growing up out of the minds that CCG-8 is using to solve—™the problems encountered during each deployment, both real and exercise.——™6.™„ASW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™ASW was difficult throughout the exercise e:9Ђя inserted in both the CHARLIE—™elements and PIM DTG fields, otherwise the satellite data would not correlate with the—™NIPs data.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™5.™„HP 9020 and Decision Aids (U)…——™™a.™(S)™CCG-8 is using a HP 9020 system to generate/provide tactical—™decision aids. The system software includes programs developed mostly by CCG-8 with—™some TAC/D&E, NOSC, and other commands' development support. The staff's—™philosophy is not to reinvent the wheel but to use algorithm98Ђяfrom NTDS, to be incorporated. However, the system could–™interface with the TFCC/FDDS or a similar system for maintaining the data base used by—™the various computer programs developed by the commands. CCG-8's evolutionary—™development of the system is resulting in a very effective decision aid.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™b.™(U)™During discussions relating to the HP 9020 decision aid, CAPT Hay—™indicated that the strength and effectiveness of this prog99Ђяfrom NTDS, to be incorporated. However, the system could–™interface with the TFCC/FDDS or a similar system for maintaining the data base used by—™the various computer programs developed by the commands. CCG-8's evolutionary—™development of the system is resulting in a very effective decision aid.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™b.™(U)™During discussions relating to the HP 9020 decision aid, CAPT Hay—™indicated that the strength and effectiveness of this prog;7Ђяspecially in the VACAPES—™area. The acoustic environment improved after the workups in the VACAPES area and—™as the effects of the Gulf Stream diminished, the ASW capability improved. As—™the TF moved east we were able to pick up some acoustic contacts on the GATO—™and a V-II submarine. As mentioned in previous reports, the "Human eye ball" was—™one of the best sensors and it is the writers opinion that the "eye ball" reporting —™really improved the contact reporting rate. (i.e., external sourc99Ђяs already developed and meld–™them into a useable system to support the decision making process of the Commander.—™One of the major uses of the system is for the determination of surface/subsurface search—™areas. The system is also used to develop Combat Air Patrol (CAP) positions and to track—™the Bear aircraft. Satellite vulnerability, remote terminals, and status boards are also–™being incorporated into the system. Presently there are not plans for automtic data–™entry systems such as those 4;Ђя00NM but—™close observation was still maintained.——™™™™4.™(S)™The 6 June 83, RECCE conducted near the Azores was over a—™6000NM round trip flight resulting in only two hours of surveillance. —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™™™5.™(S)™During the 8 June 83 RECCE, one BEAR concentrated on the French—™CV, the FOCH, and her BG. The second BEAR is believed to have taken a position NE—™of the FOSH, out of contact range of the TF, therefore only the one BEAR—™was escort:;:Ђяspecially in the VACAPES—™area. The acoustic environment improved after the workups in the VACAPES area and—™as the effects of the Gulf Stream diminished. The ASW capability improved.—™As the TF moved east we were able to pick up some acoustic contacts on the —™GATO and a V-II submarine. As mentioned in previous reports, the "Human eye ball" was—™one of the best sensors and it is the writers opinion that the "eye ball" reporting —™really improved the contact reporting rate. (i.e., external sour::Ђяces had indicated that a—™possible V-II submarine was near the TF during the workups in the VACAPES area,—™however there were only a few "possible submarine" contacts reported until the V-II—™periscope were visually sighted (Attachment 1). After the sightings the ASW picture —™was more active because "possible submarine contacts" were being reported and the—™acoustical environment was improving. It seems that everyone knew a target was in the—™area so they prosecuted the "possible submarine targe;:Ђяin the ten's digit).——™™b.™(U)™After completing the input of more than two position data, the—™program asks you if the data is correct. If an error is discovered you are to depress 1 and—™"Return". This action should recycle the program back to the previous "begin position"—™entry. The program actually inserts the incorrect data as the start point for that leg then—™asks you to re-enter the same parameters, therefore the beginning and end date/position—™are the same. This problem requires the o::Ђяperator to reinitialize the program and start—™over again. ——™™c.™(U)™The program frequently fails to print the last page of satellite—™vulnerability windows "safe times" when there is little (i.e., three to five lines) data.—™It displays the data then immediately blanks out (with a full screen flash) and initiates—™display of the next page of data without printing the last page.——™™d.™(C)™The program will not calculate the correct vulnerabilities—™using June dates. May 22, 23, 24, etc. had to be*=Ђяrcise was completed on 9 May—™83. This chart was then updated three times during the exercise. The following is a—™review of the updates:——™™™™1.™(U)™On 26 May 83, the threat was reviewed with CAPT Buckley (N2) and—™the chart predictions were updated to reflect this review.——™™™™2.™(S)™On 27 May 83, the satellite predictions were updated using the—™Field of View (FOV) parameters used by CCG-8 Staff and the JFK. Paragraph 3 of—™RECSAT Program provides the references used.——™™™™3.™(U)™On 31 May 83:;Ђяts" more enthusiastically. The—™GATO when acting as an ORANGE Unit was able to avoid being targeted by the TF and—™attacked the HMS HERMES, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.—™The GATO was targeted after her periscopes were sighted (Attachment 2) but it should be—™noted that the TF was unable to maintain contact on the GATO after she submerged. This—™was also true even after she fired green flares indicating a torpedo/missile attack. It is—™believed that she manuevered astern of the:9Ђяperator to reinitialize the program and start—™over again. ——™™c.™(U)™The program frequently fails to print the last page of satellite—™vulnerability windows "safe times" when there is little (i.e., three to five lines) data.—™It displays the data then immediately blanks out (with a full screen flash) and initiates—™display of the next page of data without printing the last page.——™™d.™(C)™The program will not calculate the correct vulnerabilities—™using June dates. May 32, 33, 34, etc. had to be:9Ђя inserted in both the CHARLIE—™elements and PIM DTG fields, otherwise the satellite data would not correlate with the—™NIPs data.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™5.™„HP 9020 and Decision Aids (U)…——™™a.™(S)™CCG-8 is using a HP 9020 system to generate/provide tactical—™decision aids. The system software includes programs developed mostly by CCG-8 with—™some TAC/D&E, NOSC, and other commands' development support. The staff's—™philosophy is not to reinvent the wheel but to use algorithm;;;Ђяerator to reinitialize the program and start—™over again. ——™™c.™(U)™The program frequently fails to print the last page of satellite—™vulnerability windows "safe times" when there is little (i.e., three to five lines) data.—™It displays the data then immediately blanks out (with a full screen flash) and initiates—™display of the next page of data without printing the last page.——™™d.™(C)™The program will not calculate the correct vulnerabilities—™using June dates. May 22, 23, 24, etc. had to be 9AЂяed by the JOHN F. KENNEDY's F-14s. The 12 June 83 RECCE was similar to—™the 8 June 83 RECCE with one exception. One BEAR stayed with the JFK BG and the—™other BEAR was 200NM to 350NM west of the JFK. Both BEARS were escorted during—™this RECCE. DRAMBUIE was also intercepted during this event (possible test to the—™AGI).——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™9.™(„C) USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (JFK) Long Range Strike on the USS AMERICA (CV 66)…—™™„(USA):…——™™a.™(S)™On 26 May 83 the JFK was able t;;Ђяin the ten's digit).——™™b.™(U)™After completing the input of more than two position data, the—™program asks you if the data is correct. If an error is discovered you are to depress 1 and—™"Return". This action should recycle the progam back to the previous "begin position"—™entry. The program actually inserts the incorrect data as the start point for that leg then—™asks you to re-enter the same parameters, therefore the beginning and end date/position—™are the same. This problem requires the op;<Ђяwas estimated that up to six real world—™submarines performed surveillance of the TF. The possible submarines—™encountered were two Victor II's, one Foxtrot, (Attachment 4) one Echo II and one or two —™Charlie SSGNs (Attachment 5). V-II and CHARLIE SSGN periscopes were sighted and—™the Foxtrot was also sighted while transiting on the surface. During the OS Exercise—™numerous sinkers and periscope feathers were also sighted but were not equated to a hull—™number.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э:;Ђя TF where the ASW coverage was the weakest.——™™b.™(S)™Standard delousing procedures, such as laying a sonobuoy barrier and—™having the ship drive through it, were used regularly but were not effective—™in detecting any submarine trailers. During one of the nightly tactics meetings, —™held nightly, a new delousing scheme was developed and critiqued by a recent—™submarine CO and the Staff. Unfortunately it was not employed due to equipment—™and time contraints.——™™c.™(S)™During the OS Exercise, it ;<Ђяinserted in both the CHARLIE—™elements and PIM DTG fields, otherwise the satellite data would not correlate with the—™NIPs data.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™5.™„HP 9020 and Decision Aids (U)…——™™a.™(S)™CCG-8 is using a HP 9020 system to generate/provide tactical—™decision aids. The system software includes programs developed mostly by CCG-8 with—™some TAC/D&E, NOSC, and other commands' development support. The staff's—™philosophy is not to reinvent the wheel but to use algorithms;:Ђяram results from the fact that—™it is being procured/leased for the group of people who will be and are applying—™it in the same tactical environment within which they are developing it. The —™program is not one brought in from/by a Lab and ordered into place by the "Fleet HQ"—™but one that is growing up out of the minds that CCG-8 is using to solve—™the problems encountered during each deployment, both real and exercise.——™6.™„ASW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™ASW was difficult throughout the exercise e<;ЂяRSATS were in error—™in both height and timing between both orbits. The NAVSPASUR orbit elements were for —™EORSATs not RORSATs.——™4.™„TEK 4052 RECSAT Computer Program Problems Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The FOV default capability did not work properly. For instance if a—™FOV had to be changed from 1000NM to 500NM, a 500/0 was inserted. The program—™inserted a 500/500. To correct this discrepancy one line of code had to be changed (i.e.,—™the "go to" address of an "if" test was in error by a "+1" <=DЂяs estimated that up to six real world—™submarines performed surveillance of the TF. The possible submarines—™encountered were two Victor II's, one Foxtrot, (Attachment 4) one Echo II and one or two —™Charlie SSGNs (Attachment 5). V-II and CHARLIE SSGN periscopes were sighted a and—™the Foxtrot was also sighted while transiting on the surface. During the OS Exercise—™numerous sinkers and periscope feathers were also sighted but were not equated to a hull—™number.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3=;Ђя—™Nov 83, 151529Z Jul 82 and 202048Z Dec 82, in addition to the DIA document—™(Reconnaissance) Surveillance Space Systems-USSR (U) DST-1480S-023-82-SA0, 12 Feb 82—™the FOV used by the ship was determined to be closer to the present intelligence—™assessment then that used by NAVSPASUR.——™™d.™(S)™By using the RECSAT Program to calculate the orbit height of the—™BOGUS satellites used during OS and information resident in N5, it was determined—™that the CHARLIE elements provided by NAVSPASUR for the RO<;Ђяrom NTDS, to be incorporated. However, the system could–™interface with the TFCC/FDDS or a similar system for maintaining the data base used by—™the various computer programs developed by the commands. CCG-8's evolutionary—™development of the system is resulting in a very effective decision aid.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™b.™(U)™During discussions relating to the HP 9020 decision aid, CAPT Hay—™indicated that the strength and effectiveness of this prog;<Ђя already developed and meld–™them into a useable system to support the decision making process of the Commander.—™One of the major uses of the system is for the determination of surface/subsurface search—™areas. The system is also used to develop Combat Air Patrol (CAP) positions and to track—™the Bear aircraft. Satellite vulnerability, remote terminals, and status boards are also–™being incorporated into the system. Presently there are not plans for automtic data–™entry systems such as those f<<Ђяng each phase of the exercise.——™15.™„Mr. Ken Miller (FTD Wright-Patterson AFB) (U)…——™™a.™(U)™Mr. Miller assisted in evaluating the Cќ3њCM support effort by providing—™new threat data and information as well as insights into threat capability. He assisted—™in maintaining the data bases and interfaced with the Staff. During the exercise—™he was briefed on the ship's systems and aircraft capabilities. He also briefed on—™the collection programs FTD is responsible for and how those programs and naG<ЂяCOs. During the meeting the day's events were—™reviewed, a weather forecast was briefed, and the tactics to be used for upcoming events—™were discussed. Usually there was a short brief (5 min) by a member of the group,—™concerning a subject of general interest. RADM Flatley really stressed brain-storming of—™ideas and dissemination of information. These meetings were very helful in providing an—™understanding on how a CARGRU operates, the objectives to be met, and—™accomplishments obtained duri<<Ђяtional—™systems can possibly be of assistance to the Navy. Persons briefed were—™COMSECONDFLT, CCG-8 and their Staff, both the JFK and USS MT WHITNEY — ™ships N2, SESS and Supplot Heads, etc!;3Ђя3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@=>=Ђяs" more enthusiastically. The—™GATO when acting as an ORANGE Unit was able to avoid being targeted by the TF and—™attacked the HMS HERMES, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.—™The GATO was targeted after her periscopes were sighted (Attachment 2) but it should be—™noted that the TF was unable to maintain contact on the GATO after she submerged. This—™was also true even after she fired green flares indicating a torpedo/missle attack. It is—™believed that she manuevered astern of the T:?Ђя/1 June 83, a review of the threat information resident—™on board the ship was reviewed and the final update was made to reflect this data.——™™c.™(U)™Overall the chart trends were fairly accurate, i.e., the type and—™number of threats were reasonably accurate but the times were not exactly—™correct. The time estimate could be much more accurate if the chart was updated daily—™using the multi-source information received by the ship. The daily update was not–™incorporated—™into the original chart p=@Ђя—™Nov 83, 151529Z Jul 82 and 202048Z Dec 82, in addition to the DIA document—™(Reconnaissance) Surveillance Space Systems-USSR (U) DST-1480S-023-82-SA0, 12 Feb 82—™the FOV used by the ship was determined to be closer to the present intelligence—™asessment then that used by NAVSPASUR.——™™d.™(S)™By using the RECSAT Program to calculate the orbit height of the—™BOGUS satellites used during OS and information resident in N5, it was determined—™that the CHARLIE elements provided by NAVSPASUR for the ROR==Ђяredictions because the usefulness of the predictins as a—™weekly and long term planning aid was being evaluated.——™™d.™(S)™The satellite overpass prediction was well within the accuracy—™required for short and long term planning even when the CHARLIE elements—™of 26 May 83 were used to calculate the number of overpasses throughout the—™entire exercise. To check the validity of predicting monthly satellite overpasses, the—™CHARLIE elements for 26 May 83 and 13 June 83 were used to calculate the num=<ЂяF where the ASW coverage was the weakest.——™™b.™(S)™Standard delousing procedures, such as laying a sonobuoy barrier and—™having the ship drive through it, were used regularly but were not effective—™in detecting any submarine trailers. During one of the nightly tactics meetings, —™held nightly, a new delousing scheme was developed and critiqued by a recent—™submarine CO and the Staff. Unfortunately it was not employed due to equipment—™and time contraints.——™™c.™(S)™During the OS Exercise, it wa*LЂя/1 June 83, a review of the threat information resident—™on board the ship was reviewed and the final update was made to reflect this data.——™™c.™(U)™Overall the chart trends were fairly accurate, i.e., the type and—™number of threats were reasonably accurate but the times were not exactly—™correct. The time estimate could be much more accurate if the chart was updated daily—™using the multi-source information received by the ship. The daily update was not—™incorporated into the original chart pr*=Ђя/1 June 83, a review of the threat information resident—™on board the ship was reviewed and the final update was made to reflect this data.——™™c.™(U)™Overall the chart trends were fairly accurate, i.e., the type and—™number of threats were reasonably accurate but the times were not exactly—™correct. The time estimate could be much more accurate if the chart was updated daily—™using the multi-source information received by the ship. The daily update was not–™incorporated—™into the original chart p=>Ђяber of—™passes for the same estimated PIM 14 June 83. Both sets of data agreed as to the exact—™number of passes. This indicates that when a similar space order of battle exists one set—™of CHARLIE elements can be used to develop a satellite overpass prediction for at least—™19 days. A comparison of the satellite rise and set times was also accomplished using—™the above inputs and PIM information. The comparison showed a maximum difference of—™two minutes in either the rise or set times. This>=>Ђя indicates that the same CHARLIE—™elements could be used to calculate safe times for a week without affecting the success—™of the presently used satellite countermeasures. A further study should be made to—™determine why the slight difference in the satellite rise and set times occur (i.e., it's—™calculation round offs, etc.).——™™e.™(S)™The aircraft arrival prediction could be determined to within an—™hour or less by using the information provided to a SESS equipped ship. The—™surface ship positi>>Ђяe variation in the—™accuracy of the sensor information provided.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™f.™(S)™In addition to the 30 day and 72 hour charts, a RORSAT vulnerability—™viewgraph was provided as a briefing aide because the OCEAN SAFARI Exercise—™incorporated two BOGUS RORSATS. The RORSAT viewgraph was similar to the one—™developed last year. Instead of using a maneuvering board chart the vulnerability—™swath was overlayed on a map with the ship also indic>DЂяrom NTDS, to be incorporated. However, the system could–™interface with the TFCC/FDDS or a similar system for maintaining the data base used by—™the various computer programs developed by the commands. CCG-8's evolutionary—™development of the system is resulting in a very effective decision aid.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™b.™(U)™During discussions relating to the HP 9020 decision aid, CAPT Hay—™indicated that the strength and effectiveness of this prog?>Ђя already developed and meld–™them into a useable system to support the decision making process of the Commander.—™One of the major uses of the system is for the determination of surface/subsurface search—™areas. The system is also used to develop Combat Air Patrol (CAP) positions and to track—™the Bear aircraft. Satellite vulnerability, remote terminals, and status boards are also–™being incorporated into the system. Presently there are not plans for automtic data–™entry systems such as those f>>Ђяon prediction is probably the easiest because of the slow—™speed of the threat and the resources available to track it. Conversely the—™subsurface target location is the most difficult to predict accurately. The—™ASW information (S3, SOSUS, Intel, Sonar, etc.) is provided to the ship but—™unless the submarine is sighted or is acoustically held for long periods it—™is difficult to HULTEC and target them. It is difficult to correlate the data—™and maintain a good accurate ASW picture because of thE>Ђяspecially in the VACAPES—™area. The acoustic environment improve after the workups in the VACAPES area and—™as the effects of the Gulf Stream diminished. The ASW capability improved.—™As the TF moved east we were able to pick up some acoustic contacts on the —™GATO and a V-II submarine. As mentioned in previous reports, the "Human eye ball" was—™one of the best sensors and it is the writers opinion that the "eye ball" reporting —™really improved the contact reporting rate. (i.e., external sourc>=Ђяes had indicated that a—™possible V-II submarine was near the TF during the workups in the VACAPES area,—™however there were only a few "possible submarine" contacts reported until the V-II—™periscope were visually sighted (Attachment 1). After the sightings the ASW picture —™was more active because "possible submarine contacts" were being reported and the—™acoustical environment was improving. It seems that everyone knew a target was in the—™area so they prosecuted the "possible submarine target>>Ђяated. This was accomplished by—™using the vulnerability information provided by the TEK 4052 RECSAT Program and—™plotting it on the HP 9020 display. The display was transferred to the hardcopy unit—™which was used as the master to make a viewgraph.——™™g.™(C)™To summarize the above; the 72 hour and 24 hour charts are useful in—™providing accurate daily pictures of the threat if they are maintained routinely.—™The 30 day chart is useful as a planning and a reconstruction aid. Automation—™of the up?>?Ђяdating and plotting of the chart is needed to minimize the manpower—™presently required to chart the information. The satellite vulnerability sections—™of the 72 hour charts were implemented in the CCG-8's HP 9020 tactical decision—™aid computer indicating the NOSC method of bar generation and coloration the threat.——™3.™„RECSAT Program (U)…——™™a.™(S)™The TEK 4052 RECSAT Program was used during the entire deployment.—™This capability not only provided a tailored product for the Cќ3њCM support—™cha>?Ђяdating and plotting of the chart is needed to minimize the manpower—™presently required to chart the information. The satellite vulnerability sections—™of the 72 hour charts were implemented in the CCG-8's HP 9020 tactical decision—™aid computer indicating the NOSC method of bar generation and coloration the threat.——™3.™„RECSAT Program:…——™™a.™(S)™The TEK 4052 RECSAT Program was used during the entire deployment.—™This capability not only provided a tailored product for the Cќ3њCM support—™charts?BЂя but was used as an evaluation tool for the SKR-7 project and —™the validation baseline for the HP 9020 SATVUL Program. It was noted that the—™TEK 4052 processing of satellite vulnerability data is approximately twice—™as fast as the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) but is an order of magnitude–™slower than the HP 9020.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™™b.™(S)™Normally the CHARLIE elements are provided to the ship weekly. To—™provide the initial threat prediction for the UN?@Ђяrts but was used as an evaluation tool for the SKR-7 project and —™the validation baseline for the HP 9020 SATVUL Program. It was noted that the—™TEK 4052 processing of satellite vulnerability data is approximately twice—™as fast as the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) but is an order of magnitude–™slower than the HP 9020.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™™b.™(S)™Normally the CHARLIE elements are provided to the ship weekly. To—™provide the initial threat prediction for theA>Ђяinserted in both the CHARLIE—™elements and PIM DTG fields, otherwise the satellite data would not correlate with the—™NIPs data.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™5.™„HP 9020 and Decision Aids (U)…——™™a,™(S)™CCG-8 is using a HP 9020 system to generate/provide tactical—™decision aids. The system software includes programs developed mostly by CCG-8 with—™some TAC/D&E, NOSC, and other commands' development support. The staff's—™philosophy is not to reinvent the wheel but to use algorithms=?Ђяredictions because the usefulness of the predictins as a—™weekly and long term planning aid was being evaluated.——™™d.™(S)™The satellite overpass prediction was well within the accuracy—™required for short and long term planning even when the CHARLIE elements—™of 26 May 83 were used to calculate the number of overpasses throughout the—™entire exercise. To check the validity of predicting monthly satellite overpasses, the—™CHARLIE elements for 26 May 83 and 13 June 83 were used to calculate the num??Ђяber of—™passes for the same estimated PIM 14 June 83. Both sets of data agreed as to the exact—™number of passes. This indicates that when a similar space order of battle exists one set—™of CHARLIE elements can be used to develop a satellite overpass prediction for at least—™19 days. A comparison of the satellite rise and set times was also accomplished using—™the above inputs and PIM information. The comparison showed a maximum difference of—™two minutes in either the rise or set times. This?CЂя indicates that the same CHARLIE—™elements could be used to calculate safe times for a week without affecting the success—™of the presently used satellite countermeasures. A further study should be made to—™determine why the slight difference in the satellite rise and set times occur (i.e., it's—™calculation round offs, etc.).——™™e.™(S)™The aircraft arrival prediction could be determined to within an—™hour or less by using the information provided to a SESS equipped ship. The—™surface ship positi@?@Ђя UNITED EFFORT Exercise, the—™CHARLIE elements for 19 May 83 were used. The determination of the number—™of overflights in any one day in the future is not too critical if used as a planning—™aid. However, if a deception has to be planned or if the TF's EMCON policy is to be—™determined with consideratin of satellite vulnerability, then the rise and set times must—™be accurate and the newest elements should be used. It was decided that a study should—™be conducted to determine if using coudated @@ЂяCHARLIE elements would significantly—™effect the calculations of the vulnerability windows. Fortunately the ship was being—™provided daily CHARLIE elements in support of the SKR-7 Project. These daily—™elements were catalogued in the TEK 4052 and compared for differences in element—™parameters. Each set was then used to calculate the vulnerability times for an—™indentical PIM. The results showed that the elements do change to some degree from—™day to day but the rise and set times were only aff@@Ђя the ten's digit).——™™b.™(U)™After completing the input of more than two position data, the—™program asks you if the data is correct. If an error is discovered you are to depress 1 and—™"Return". This action should recycles the progam back to the previous "begin position"—™entry. The program actually inserts the incorrect data as the start point for that leg then—™asks you to re-enter the same parameters, therefore the beginning and end date/position—™are the same. This problem requires the ope@@Ђяability windows throughout—™the exercise, no matter which elements were used. Therefore a round-off of two—™minues for the rise and set times would insure that the safe times are indeed—™safe.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™c.™(S)™During the comparison study it was discovered that the FOV used for—™Category 3 threat satellites provided within the NAVSPASUR program is different from—™the FOV used by the ship's NIPS Program. After review of the NISC messages 040@@ЂяSATS were in error—™in both height and timing between both orbits. The NAVSPASUR orbit elements was for —™EORSATs not RORSATs.——™4.™„(U) TEK 4052 RECSAT Computer Program Problems Summary…——™™a.™(s)™The FOV default capability did not work properly. For instance if a—™FOV had to be changed from 1000NM to 500NM, a 500/0 was inserted. The program—™inserted a 500/500. To correct this discrepancy one line of code had to be changed (i.e.,—™the "go to" address of an "if" test was in error by a "+1" in@@Ђяected by no more than one minute—™for the period of time covered. This random one minute change occurred very—™seldom and can most likely be attributed to the calculation round-off rather than—™to the slight change in the elements. It was determined that the normal weekly —™update of the CHARLIE elements is quite sufficient for calculating vulnerability—™times and satellite countermeasures when operating with the present space order of—™battle. Actually there was significant change in the vulner@AЂяrator to reinitialize the program and start—™over again. ——™™c.™(U)™The program frequently fails to print the last page of satellite—™vulnerability windows "safe times" when there is little (i.e., three to five lines) data.—™It displays the data then immediately blanks out (with a full screen flash) and initiates—™display of the next page of data without printing the last page..——™™d.™(C)™The program will not calculate the correct vulnerabilities—™using June dates. May 32, 33, 34, etc. had to be @=Ђя002ZA@AЂяSATS were in error—™in both height and timing between both orbits. The NAVSPASUR orbit elements was for —™EORSATs not RORSATs.——™4.™„TEK 4052 RECSAT Computer Program Problems Summary (U)…——™™a.™(s)™The FOV default capability did not work properly. For instance if a—™FOV had to be changed from 1000NM to 500NM, a 500/0 was inserted. The program—™inserted a 500/500. To correct this discrepancy one line of code had to be changed (i.e.,—™the "go to" address of an "if" test was in error by a "+1" inA?Ђяrator to reinitialize the program and start—™over again. ——™™c.™(U)™The program frequently fails to print the last page of satellite—™vulnerability windows "safe times" when there is little (i.e., three to five lines) data.—™It displays the data then immediately blanks out (with a full screen flash) and initiates—™display of the next page of data without printing the last page..——™™d.™(C)™The program will not calculate the correct vulnerabilities—™using June dates. May 32, 33, 34, etc. had to be @CЂяinserted in both the CHARLIE—™elements and PIM DTG fields, otherwise the satellite data would not correlate with the—™NIPs data.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™5.™(„U) HP 9020 and Decision Aids:…——™™a,™(S)™CCG-8 is using a HP 9020 system to generate/provide tactical—™decision aids. The system software includes programs developed mostly by CCG-8 with—™some TAC/D&E, NOSC, and other commands' development support. The staff's—™philosophy is not to reinvent the wheel but to use algorithmAAЂяH@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™14.™(„U) Daily 1900 Tactics Meeting:…——™™a.™(U)™ The writer was afforded the opportunity to sit-in and participate in a daily—™tactics meeting held at 1900 in the War Room. Participants were CCG-8/Staff, the ship's—™CO, OPS, CAG and some squadron COs. During the meeting the day's events were—™reviewed, a weather forecast was briefed, and the tactics to be used for upcoming events—™were discussed. Usually there was a short brief (5 min) by a member of the group,—™concerning AAЂя the ten's digit).——™™b.™(U)™After completing the input of more than two position data, the—™program asks you if the data is correct. If an error is discovered you are to depress 1 and—™"Return". This action should recycles the progam back to the previous "begin position"—™entry. The program actually inserts the incorrect data as the start point for that leg then—™asks you to re-enter the same parameters, therefore the beginning and end date/position—™are the same. This problem requires the opeAAЂя capability. He assisted—™in maintaining the data bases and interfaced with the Staff. During the exercise—™he was briefed on the ship's systems and aircraft capabilities. He also briefed on—™the collection programs FTD is responsible for and how those programs and national—™systems can possibly be of assistance to the Navy. Persons briefed were—™COMSECONDFLT, CCG-8 and their Staff, both the JFK and USS MT WHITNEY — ™ships N2, SESS and Supplot Heads, etc!;BЂяo determine USS AMERICA's (USA)—™position by the BEAR reconnaisance of the USA. Between 26 and 29 May 83, JFK had no—™updates relating to USA's position because of her EMCON status. CCG-8 and the Staff—™used the HP 9020 "search and track" programs to develop a long range search profile to—™estimate the position of the USA. The staff developed the "search profile" with only the—™knowledge of: a) location the USA had occupied on 26 May 83, b) that she was to be in—™port at Norfolk on 2 June 83, AAЂяa subject of general interest. RADM Flatley really stressed brain-storming of—™ideas and dissemination of information. These meetings were very helful in providing an—™understanding on how a CARGRU operates, the objectives to be met, and—™accomplishments obtained during each phase of the exercise.——™15.™(„U) Mr. Ken Miller (FTD Wright-Patterson AFB):…——™™a.™(U)™Mr. Miller assisted in evaluating the Cќ3њCM support effort by providing—™new threat data and information as well as insights into threatBABЂяand c) what type of weather she could expect to encounter.—™It was evaluated that the USA could use any of three basic tracks. The JFK planned to—™use the S-3s aircract for the search, then attached with A6 aircraft. Using the probable—™tracks developed on the HP 9020 the second S-3 search plan resulted in the location of the—™USA and the A6s made a successful attack at approximately 850 miles from the JFK.—™Chief of Staff, CAPT Don Hay stated that the Strike could not have been made without—™theBBЂяeconnaisance of the task force which—™precluded the complete application of ECM. In addition to the BEARS causing—™a diversion of attention, the TF was engaging a strike on the USS AMERICA in a—™PASSEX. During this encounter a B-52 was able to approach within 225NM of the TF—™before being detected and escorted.——™™c.™(S)™The second wave of two B-52s was detected early enough so that chaff was—™deployed against them prior to their being escorted. An EA6B also provided jamming—™from the vicinity oBEЂяn not in EMCON Bravo. If LRI were—™used, the COPS program would be used to determine the frequency and power levels—™to effect LRI communications. The PROPHET System is used to validate the convertness—™of the cops frequency and power prediction. (The COPS is primarily used because it is—™more user oriented and the staff has a dedicated WANG System). —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ—™™d.™(S)™The Ship Towed Acoustic Deception Device (STADD) was deployed on USCG?BЂяITED EFFORT Exercise, the—™CHARLIE elements for 19 May 83 were used. The determination of the number—™of overflights in any one day in the future is not too critical if used as a planning—™aid. However, if a deception has to be planned or if the TF's EMCON policy is to be—™determined with consideratin of satellite vulnerability, then the rise and set times must—™be accurate and the newest elements should be used. It was decided that a study should—™be conducted to determine if using coudated CHABBЂя use of the HP 9020 and the programs that have been developed for use in mission—™planning and the CCG-8 decision aids.——™10.™(U)™„B52 Exercise:…——™™a.™(S)™The exercise included four B-52s in two waves of two aircraft each that—™flew on TF 419. The B-52s were to detect, classify, and target the JFK.—™The TF was to use chaff, jamming, and deception to help the JFK elude the B-52s.——™™b.™(S)™Prior to Comex, and during the first intercept by the B-52, is the Cuba—™deployed BEAR "Ds" were performing rBCЂяf the JFK. The B-52s truned toward and RECCE'D the BIDDLE before—™performing RECCE of the JFK.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™d.™(C)™Post analysis of information from the B-52s will have to be completed—™before any evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of the ECM and deception used by—™the TF.——™11.™(„U) NOSC Systems Used in UE/OS:…——™™a.™(C)™The UHF relay POD (SATCAT) was flown throughout the exercise on S-3s—™and A6s. It was usually double cycled up CBЂя——™™b.™(S)™The IREPS is well received and is used daily to calculate and provide—™ducting information. It is also used for some vulnerability to threat calculations.—™This data is presented at the Staff briefings every morning and evening as well as —™transmitted, via daily message, to all the ships in company. The information is—™also included in the AIRCREN flight briefings.——™™c.™(S)™The HF PROPHET and COPS programs are used to determine the optimal—™frequency to be used in the HF spectrum wheBCЂяRLIE elements would significantly—™effect the calculations of the vulnerability windows. Fortunately the ship was being—™provided daily CHARLIE elements in support of the SKR-7 Project. These daily—™elements were catalogued in the TEK 4052 and compared for differences in element—™parameters. Each set was then used to calculate the vulnerability times for an—™indentical PIM. The results showed that the elements do change to some degree from—™day to day but the rise and set times were only affectCACЂяs already developed and meld–™them into a useable system to support the decision making process of the Commander.—™One of the major uses of the system is for the determination of surface/subsurface search—™areas. The system is also used to develop Combat Air Patrol (CAP) positions and to track—™the Bear aircraft. Satellite vulnerability, remote terminals, and status boards are also–™being incorporated into the system. Presently there are not plans for automtic data–™entry systems such as those BCЂяthen down one cycle. Many times it was—™removed from one airplane and attached to another with no maintenance performed. The—™POD was used for link coordination, ASW/ASUW C&R net, TTY, and link eleven relay.—™The system has been flown nearly 1000 hours and works quite well although the following—™problems were noted:——™™™™1.™(C)™During the first three or four days, linking problems were —™encountered. This is attributed to training the new users in the operational—™procedures required to link wiBCЂяed by no more than one minute—™for the period of time covered. This random one minute change occurred very—™seldom and can most likely be attributed to the calculation round-off rather than—™to the slight change in the elements. It was determined that the normal weekly —™update of the CHARLIE elements is quite sufficient for calculating vulnerability—™times and satellite countermeasures when operating with the present space order of—™battle. Actually there was significant change in the vulnerabiC=ЂяZCDЂяfrom NTDS, to be incorporated. However, the system could–™interface with the TFCC/FDDS or a similar system for maintaining the data base used by—™the various computer programs developed by the commands. CCG-8's evolutionary—™development of the system is resulting in a very effective decision aid.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™b.™(U)™During discussions relating to the HP 9020 decision aid, CAPT Hay—™indicated that the strength and effectiveness of this progCBЂяth the POD.——™™™™2.™(C)™The POD was installed once between the fuselage and the engine on—™an S-3, thereby shadowing the antennae and causing intermittant communications.——™™™™3.™(U)™One transceiver failed and was replaced with the unused traansceiver—™(Channel #5.)——™™™™4.™(U)™An input connector to the splitter was inadvertantly cross threaded—™resulting in RFI problems.——ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@эђ™™™™5.™(U)™Attenuators had to be removed or lowered in value to peak up the—™system.CCЂяlity windows throughout—™the exercise, no matter which elements were used. Therefore a round-off of two—™minues for the rise and set times would insure that the safe times are indeed—™safe.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™c.™(S)™During the comparison study it was discovered that the FOV used for—™Category 3 threat satellites provided within the NAVSPASUR program is different from—™the FOV used by the ship's NIPS Program. After review of the NISC messages 040002?DЂяon prediction is probably the easiest because of the slow—™speed of the threat and the resources available to track it. Conversely the—™subsurface target location is the most difficult to predict accurately. The—™ASW information (S3, SOSUS, Intel, Sonar, etc.) is provided to the ship but—™unless the submarine is sighted or is acoustically held for long periods it—™is difficult to HULTEC and target them. It is difficult to correlate the data—™and maintain a good accurate ASW picture because of thDDDЂяespecially in the VACAPES—™area. The acoustic environment improve after the workups in the VACAPES area and—™as the effects of the Gulf Stream diminished. The ASW capability improved.—™As the TF moved east we were able to pick up some acoustic contacts on the —™GATO and a V-II submarine. As mentioned in previous reports, the "Human eye ball" was—™one of the best sensors and it is the writers opinion that the "eye ball" reporting —™really improved the contact reporting rate. (i.e., external sourDDЂяces had indicated that a—™possible V-II submarine was near the TF during the workups in the VACAPES area,—™however there were only a few "possible submarine" contacts reported until the V-II—™periscope were visually sighted (Attachment 1). After the sightings the ASW picture —™was more active because "possible submarine contacts" were being reported and the—™acoustical environment was improving. It seems that everyone knew a target was in the—™area so they prosecuted the "possible submarine targeDDЂяTF where the ASW coverage was the weakest.——™™b.™(S)™Standard delousing procedures, such as laying a sonobuoy barrier and—™having the ship drive through it, were used regularly but were not effective—™in detecting any submarine trailers. During one of the nightly tactics meetings, —™held nightly, a new delousing scheme was developed and critiqued by a recent—™submarine CO and the Staff. Unfortunately it was not employed due to equipment—™and time contraints.——™™c.™(S)™During the OS Exercise, it wD3ЂяHэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@CDЂяram results from the fact that—™it is being procured/leased for the group of people who will be and are applying—™it in the same tactical environment within which they are developing it. The —™program is not one brought in from/by a Lab and ordered into place by the "Fleet HQ"—™but one that is growing up out of the minds that CCG-8 is using to solve—™the problems encountered during each deployment, both real and exercise.——™6.™(„U) ASW Summary:…——™™a.™(S)™ASW was difficult throughout the exercise DDЂяts" more enthusiastically. The—™GATO when acting as an ORANGE Unit was able to avoid being targeted by the TF and—™attacked the HMS HERMES, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.—™The GATO was targeted after her periscopes were sighted (Attachment 2) but it should be—™noted that the TF was unable to maintain contact on the GATO after she submerged. This—™was also true even after she fired green flares indicating a torpedo/missle attack. It is—™believed that she manuevered astern of the DDЂяas estimated that up to six real world—™submarines performed surveillance of the TF. The possible submarines—™encountered were two Victor II's, one Foxtrot, (Attachment 4) one Echo II and one or two —™Charlie SSGNs (Attachment 5). V-II and CHARLIE SSGN periscopes were sighted a and—™the Foxtrot was also sighted while transiting on the surface. During the OS Exercise—™numerous sinkers and periscope feathers were also sighted but were not equated to a hull—™number.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3CEЂяe variation in the—™accuracy of the sensor information provided.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™f.™(S)™In addition to the 30 day and 72 hour charts, a RORSAT vulnerability—™viewgraph was provided as a briefing aide because the OCEAN SAFARI Exercise—™incorporated two BOGUS RORSATS. The RORSAT viewgraph was similar to the one—™developed last year. Instead of using a maneuvering board chart the vulnerability—™swath was overlayed on a map with the ship also indicEBEЂя—™CHASE throughout both of the exercises. Preliminary information received indicates that—™the GATO was lured toward and attacked the CHASE, (CHASE 052000Z JUN 83). The—™system is holding up and there appears to be no further cable problems when deploying the—™array . (During previous exercises two cables were damaged during first few—™deployments).——™™e.™(S)™The Ship Identification Demonstration Model (SIDM) is still on track to be—™deployed on the USS BIDDLE for the BALTOPS Exercise. COMDESREEЂяuld send a message to NOSC requesting the Stan—™Miyashiro drop off the tapes in London while in transit to meet the USS BIDDLE. The—™Staff really praises the system and with the problems encountered with the SINS lately—™(60NM to 100NM off in position) the GPS would have been invaluable.—™—™12.™„(U) SESS Operations:…——™During this deployement the SESS was outfitted with some programmable Watkins Johnson—™(WJ) Receivers, Sony Wide Band Receivers, a prototype Automatic CW Recognition/—™Encoder DevicEFЂяthe systems used in—™most SESSs. The CCSC and SKR-7 were being evaluated by OPTEVOFR. Questions—™regarding these systems should be directed to OPTEVFOR, LCDR R. Stewart.——™13.™„(U) NRL P-3 Fly By:…——™™a.™(S)™NRL flew it's P-3 over the TF to measure the differences of SRBOC and—™the NATO SEANAT chaff without IR. Specific results of this test will have to be—™obtained directly from NRL. NRL's P-3 has the capability to simulate some of the threat—™missiles and radars and offered to simulate these ELЂяuld send a message to NOSC requesting the Stan—™Miyashiro drop off the tapes in London while in transit to meet the USS BIDDLE. The—™Staff really praises the system and with the problems encountered with the SINS lately—™(60NM to 100NM off in position) the GPS would have been invaluable.—™—™12.™„SESS Operations (U)…——™During this deployement the SESS was outfitted with some programmable Watkins Johnson—™(WJ) Receivers, Sony Wide Band Receivers, a prototype Automatic CW Recognition/—™Encoder DeviceEEЂяON 32 in USS—™BIDDLE requested a waiver to use the SLQ-20 in the active mode during this follow-on—™exercise but was turned down by CINCLANTFLT. The demonstration test will be without—™this capability.——™™f.™(S)™The Global Positioning System (GPS) deployed on the JFK has been basically—™inoperative since the start of the exercise. The Staff is awaiting receipt of new program—™tapes from NOSC. The writer suggested that if the tapes were the only thing preventing—™the use of the GPS, then CCG-8 coC>Ђяram results from the fact that—™it is being procured/leased for the group of people who will be and are applying—™it in the same tactical environment within which they are developing it. The —™program is not one brought in from/by a Lab and ordered into place by the "Fleet HQ"—™but one that is growing up out of the minds that CCG-8 is using to solve—™the problems encountered during each deployment, both real and exercise.——™6.™„ASW Summary (U)…——™™a.™(S)™ASW was difficult throughout the exercise eDFЂяated. This was accomplished by—™using the vulnerability information provided by the TEK 4052 RECSAT Program and—™plotting it on the HP 9020 display. The display was transferred to the hardcopy unit—™which was used as the master to make a viewgraph.——™™g.™(C)™To summarize the above; the 72 hour and 24 hour charts are useful in—™providing accurate daily pictures of the threat if they are maintained routinely.—™The 30 day chart is useful as a planning and a reconstruction aid. Automation—™of the upEEЂяe, a Cryptologic Combat Support Console (CCSC) and the SKR-7. It should—™be noted that many ships with SESS are buying the Sony (ICF 2000) Receivers because the—™standard receivers are manually tuned and man inensive to operate. The SESS crew stated—™that because of the WJ's and Sony receivers they had the most automated space, aboard a—™ship, in the Navy. Interestingly enough, these receivers are relatively inexpensive and are—™not the state-of-the-art receivers but are a magnitude better than FEFЂяdating and plotting of the chart is needed to minimize the manpower—™presently required to chart the information. The satellite vulnerability sections—™of the 72 hour charts were implemented in the CCG-8's HP 9020 tactical decision—™aid computer indicating the NOSC method of bar generation and coloration the threat.——™3.™„RECSAT Program:…——™™a.™(S)™The TEK 4052 RECSAT Program was used during the entire deployment.—™This capability not only provided a tailored product for the Cќ3њCM support—™chartsFFЂя but was used as an evaluation tool for the SKR-7 project and —™the validation baseline for the HP 9020 SATVUL Program. It was noted that the—™TEK 4052 processing of satellite vulnerability data is approximately twice—™as fast as the Naval Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) but is an order of magnitude–™slower than the HP 9020.——™™b.™(S)™Normally the CHARLIE elements are provided to the ship weekly. To—™provide the initial threat prediction for the UNITED EFFORT Exercise, the—™CHARLIE elementsFFЂя for 19 May 83 were used. The determination of the number—™of overflights in any one day in the future is not too critical if used as a planning—™aid. However, if a deception has to be planned or if the TF's EMCON policy is to be—™determined with consideratin of satellite vulnerability, then the rise and set times must—™be accurate and the newest elements should be used. It was decided that a study should—™be conducted to determine if using coudated CHARLIE elements would significantly—™effect tFFЂяod of time covered. This random one minute change occurred very—™seldom and can most likely be attributed to the calculation round-off rather than—™to the slight change in the elements. It was determined that the normal weekly —™update of the CHARLIE elements is quite sufficient for calculating vulnerability—™times and satellite countermeasures when operating with the present space order of—™battle. Actually there was significant change in the vulnerability windows throughout—™the exercise, no mEAЂяwhile flying within the TF to provide—™training for the EW operators and to exercise the EW systems. The simulation—™was successful and the operators appreciated the training they received.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@FGЂя2, in addition to the DIA document—™(Reconnaissance) Surveillance Space Systems-USSR (U) DST-1480S-023-82-SA0, 12 Feb 82—™the FOV used by the ship was determined to be closer to the present intelligence—™asessment then that used by NAVSPASUR.——™™d.™(S)™By using the RECSAT Program to calculate the orbit height of the—™BOGUS satellites used during OS and information resident in N5, it was determined—™that the CHARLIE elements provided by NAVSPASUR for the RORSATS were in error—™in both height and timFFЂяhe calculations of the vulnerability windows. Fortunately the ship was being—™provided daily CHARLIE elements in support of the SKR-7 Project. These daily—™elements were catalogued in the TEK 4052 and compared for differences in element—™parameters. Each set was then used to calculate the vulnerability times for an—™indentical PIM. The results showed that the elements do change to some degree from—™day to day but the rise and set times were only affected by no more than one minute—™for the periFFЂяatter which elements were used. Therefore a round-off of two—™minues for the rise and set times would insure that the safe times are indeed—™safe.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™c.™(S)™During the comparison study it was discovered that the FOV used for—™Category 3 threat satellites provided within the NAVSPASUR program is different from—™the FOV used by the ship's NIPS Program. After review of the NISC messages 040002Z—™Nov 83, 151529Z Jul 82 and 202048Z Dec 8GFGЂяing between both orbits. The NAVSPASUR orbit elements was for —™EORSATs not RORSATs.——™4.™„(U) TEK 4052 RECSAT Computer Program Problems Summary…——™™a.™(s)™The FOV default capability did not work properly. For instance if a—™FOV had to be changed from 1000NM to 500NM, a 500/0 was inserted. The program—™inserted a 500/500. To correct this discrepancy one line of code had to be changed (i.e.,—™the "go to" address of an "if" test was in error by a "+1" in the ten's digit).——™™b.™(U)™After completGGЂяt—™over again. ——™™c.™(U)™The program frequently fails to print the last page of satellite—™vulnerability windows "safe times" when there is little (i.e., three to five lines) data.—™It displays the data then immediately blanks out (with a full screen flash) and initiates—™display of the next page of data without printing the last page..——™™d.™(C)™The program will not calculate the correct vulnerabilities—™using June dates. May 32, 33, 34, etc. had to be inserted in both the CHARLIE—™elements andK<Ђяile flying within the TF to provide—™training for the EW operators and to exercise the EW systems. The simulation—™was successful and the operators appreciated the training they received.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™14.™„Daily 1900 Tactics Meeting (U)…——™™a.™(U)™ The writer was afforded the opportunity to sit-in and participate in a daily—™tactics meeting held at 1900 in the War Room. Participants were CCG-8/Staff, the ship's—™CO, OPS, CAG and some squadron GGЂяDS or a similar system for maintaining the data base used by—™the various computer programs developed by the commands. CCG-8's evolutionary—™development of the system is resulting in a very effective decision aid.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™b.™(U)™During discussions relating to the HP 9020 decision aid, CAPT Hay—™indicated that the strength and effectiveness of this program results from the fact that—™it is being procured/leased for the group of people wGGЂяing the input of more than two position data, the—™program asks you if the data is correct. If an error is discovered you are to depress 1 and—™"Return". This action should recycles the progam back to the previous "begin position"—™entry. The program actually inserts the incorrect data as the start point for that leg then—™asks you to re-enter the same parameters, therefore the beginning and end date/position—™are the same. This problem requires the operator to reinitialize the program and starGGЂя PIM DTG fields, otherwise the satellite data would not correlate with the—™NIPs data.——™5.™(„U) HP 9020 and Decision Aids:…——™™a,™(S)™CCG-8 is using a HP 9020 system to generate/provide tactical—™decision aids. The system software includes programs developed mostly by CCG-8 with—™some TAC/D&E, NOSC, and other commands' development support. The staff's—™philosophy is not to reinvent the wheel but to use algorithms already developed and meld–™them into a useable system to support the decision makiGGЂяng process of the Commander.—™One of the major uses of the system is for the determination of surface/subsurface search—™areas. The system is also used to develop Combat Air Patrol (CAP) positions and to track—™the Bear aircraft. Satellite vulnerability, remote terminals, and status boards are also–™being incorporated into the system. Presently there are not plans for automtic data–™entry systems such as those from NTDS, to be incorporated. However, the system could–™interface with the TFCC/FDGHЂяho will be and are applying—™it in the same tactical environment within which they are developing it. The —™program is not one brought in from/by a Lab and ordered into place by the "Fleet HQ"—™but one that is growing up out of the minds that CCG-8 is using to solve—™the problems encountered during each deployment, both real and exercise.——™6.™(„U) ASW Summary:…——™™a.™(S)™ASW was difficult throughout the exercise especially in the VACAPES—™area. The acoustic environment improve after the workups HGHЂяin the VACAPES area and—™as the effects of the Gulf Stream diminished. The ASW capability improved.—™As the TF moved east we were able to pick up some acoustic contacts on the —™GATO and a V-II submarine. As mentioned in previous reports, the "Human eye ball" was—™one of the best sensors and it is the writers opinion that the "eye ball" reporting —™really improved the contact reporting rate. (i.e., external sources had indicated that a—™possible V-II submarine was near the TF during the workups HHЂя being targeted by the TF and—™attacked the HMS HERMES, USS MOUNT WHITNEY, and the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY.—™The GATO was targeted after her periscopes were sighted (Attachment 2) but it should be—™noted that the TF was unable to maintain contact on the GATO after she submerged. This—™was also true even after she fired green flares indicating a torpedo/missle attack. It is—™believed that she manuevered astern of the TF where the ASW coverage was the weakest.——™™b.™(S)™Standard delousing procedures, sHHЂя The possible submarines—™encountered were two Victor II's, one Foxtrot, (Attachment 4) one Echo II and one or two —™Charlie SSGNs (Attachment 5). V-II and CHARLIE SSGN periscopes were sighted a and—™the Foxtrot was also sighted while transiting on the surface. During the OS Exercise—™numerous sinkers and periscope feathers were also sighted but were not equated to a hull—™number.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™d.™(S)™The Advance Autonomous Array (Aќ3њ) buoy HHЂяSystem.——™7.™(„U) ASUW Summary:…——™™a.™(S)™The two AGIs encountered during the workup phase for the exercise—™and the continued surveillance by the SSV 512 was expected. It was somewhat—™of a suprise that up to eight non-combatants did perform surveillance of the—™TF during the UE/OS Exercises. The ships were four AGIs (SSV 512, 514, 506—™and the TRAVER), two AGORs (PERSEY and KRUZENSHTERN), one AOR (DNESTR)—™and briefly one SRS (MUSSON). The AGIs, SSV 512 and SSV 506 were the most—™active in thHHЂяin the VACAPES area,—™however there were only a few "possible submarine" contacts reported until the V-II—™periscope were visually sighted (Attachment 1). After the sightings the ASW picture —™was more active because "possible submarine contacts" were being reported and the—™acoustical environment was improving. It seems that everyone knew a target was in the—™area so they prosecuted the "possible submarine targets" more enthusiastically. The—™GATO when acting as an ORANGE Unit was able to avoidHHЂяuch as laying a sonobuoy barrier and—™having the ship drive through it, were used regularly but were not effective—™in detecting any submarine trailers. During one of the nightly tactics meetings, —™held nightly, a new delousing scheme was developed and critiqued by a recent—™submarine CO and the Staff. Unfortunately it was not employed due to equipment—™and time contraints.——™™c.™(S)™During the OS Exercise, it was estimated that up to six real world—™submarines performed surveillance of the TF. HHЂяwas deployed during both UE/OS.—™During the UE Exercise the system was not very effective, largely due to the positions—™where the buoy was deployed. During the OS, it provided many more "pos sub" contacts—™and in one case held a pos V-II contact for over six hours at a range in excess of 100nm.—™The position reported by the Aќ3њ System was not held by SOSUS, therefore a helo deployed—™a sonobuoy field, resulting in a verification that a pos V-II was in the area comfirming the—™report by the Aќ3њ HIЂяe surveillance of the USS JOHN F. KENNEDY. It is possible that—™two acted as a team with the SSV 512 doing most of the communicating and the SSV 506—™operating in EMCON. It was postulated that the SSV 512 was also used as a sub-—™marine queing platform. The possibility of the AGIs being used as a platform—™to test the BEAR PRAMBUIE link is also being investigated by the INTEL staffs. The only—™combatant to perform surveillance of the TF was the KRESTA II, CG 681. She was only in—™the area for IHIЂяa few days passing very close to the JFK before continuing her—™transit to the west coast of Africa. ——™8.™(„U) AAW Summary:…——™™a.™(S)™The BEARS flew RECCE missions against the TF five times. The first—™two occurred in the VACAPES area on 17 and 31 May 83. During the transit phase—™of UE two BEAR "Fs" and two BEAR "Ds" departed Cuba for Norflt on 30 May and—™3 June respectively. Two BEAR "Ds" also flew from Luanda to Cuba on 3 June 83.—™During OS the BEAR "D" flow RECCE on the TF on 6, 8 and IIЂяs was over a—™6000NM round trip flight resulting in only two hours of surveillance. —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™™™5.™(S)™During the 8 June 83 RECCE, one BEAR concentrated on the French—™CV, the FOCH, and her BG. The second BEAR is believed to have taken a position NE—™of the FOSH, out of contact range of the TF, therefore only the one BEAR—™was escorted by the JOHN F. KENNEDY's F-14s. The 12 June 83 RECCE was similar to—™the 8 June 83 RECCE with one excepIIЂяion because of her EMCON status. CCG-8 and the Staff—™used the HP 9020 "search and track" programs to develop a long range search profile to—™estimate the position of the USA. The staff developed the "search profile" with only the—™knowledge of: a) location the USA had occupied on 26 May 83, b) that she was to be in—™port at Norfolk on 2 June 83, and c) what type of weather she could expect to encounter.—™It was evaluated that the USA could use any of three basic tracks. The JFK planned to—™usIIЂя.™(S)™The exercise included four B-52s in two waves of two aircraft each that—™flew on TF 419. The B-52s were to detect, classify, and target the JFK.—™The TF was to use chaff, jamming, and deception to help the JFK elude the B-52s.——™™b.™(S)™Prior to Comex, and during the first intercept by the B-52, is the Cuba—™deployed BEAR "Ds" were performing reconnaisance of the task force which—™precluded the complete application of ECM. In addition to the BEARS causing—™a diversion of attention, the TF wIIЂя12 June 83. The flights were—™considered routine but a few observations are worth noting.——™™™™1.™(S)™The first RECCE occurred within 80NM to 100NM of the east coast.——™™™™2.™(S)™The return of the BEAR "Fs" to Norflt on 30 May 83 would have had —™a CPA (of approximately 200NM) to the TF if the TF was able to maintain the PIM.——™™™™3.™(S)™On 3 June 83, the CPA of the BEARS to the TF was over 500NM but—™close observation was still maintained.——™™™™4.™(S)™The 6 June 83, RECCE conducted near the AzoreIIЂяtion. One BEAR stayed with the JFK BG and the—™other BEAR was 200NM to 350NM west of the JFK. Both BEARS were escorted during—™this RECCE. DRAMBUIE was also intercepted during this event (possible test to the—™AGI).——™9.™(„C) USS JOHN F. KENNEDY (JFK) Long Range Strike on the USS AMERICA (CV 66)…—™™„(USA):…——™™a.™(S)™On 26 May 83 the JFK was able to determine USS AMERICA's (USA)—™position by the BEAR reconnaisance of the USA. Between 26 and 29 May 83, JFK had no—™updates relating to USA's positIIЂяe the S-3s aircract for the search, then attached with A6 aircraft. Using the probable—™tracks developed on the HP 9020 the second S-3 search plan resulted in the location of the—™USA and the A6s made a successful attack at approximately 850 miles from the JFK.—™Chief of Staff, CAPT Don Hay stated that the Strike could not have been made without—™the use of the HP 9020 and the programs that have been developed for use in mission—™planning and the CCG-8 decision aids.——™10.™(U)™„B52 Exercise:…——™™aIJЂяas engaging a strike on the USS AMERICA in a—™PASSEX. During this encounter a B-52 was able to approach within 225NM of the TF—™before being detected and escorted.——™™c.™(S)™The second wave of two B-52s was detected early enough so that chaff was—™deployed against them prior to their being escorted. An EA6B also provided jamming—™from the vicinity of the JFK. The B-52s truned toward and RECCE'D the BIDDLE before—™performing RECCE of the JFK.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@JIJЂяэ9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™d.™(C)™Post analysis of information from the B-52s will have to be completed—™before any evaluation can be made of the effectiveness of the ECM and deception used by—™the TF.——™11.™(„U) NOSC Systems Used in UE/OS:…——™™a.™(C)™The UHF relay POD (SATCAT) was flown throughout the exercise on S-3s—™and A6s. It was usually double cycled up then down one cycle. Many times it was—™removed from one airplane and attached to another with no maintenance performed. The—™POD was used for link JJЂяtant communications.——™™™™3.™(U)™One transceiver failed and was replaced with the unused traansceiver—™(Channel #5.)——™™™™4.™(U)™An input connector to the splitter was inadvertantly cross threaded—™resulting in RFI problems.——™™™™5.™(U)™Attenuators had to be removed or lowered in value to peak up the—™system.——™™b.™(S)™The IREPS is well received and is used daily to calculate and provide—™ducting information. It is also used for some vulnerability to threat calculations.—™This data is presented atJJЂяconvertness—™of the cops frequency and power prediction. (The COPS is primarily used because it is—™more user oriented and the staff has a dedicated WANG System). —•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ—™™d.™(S)™The Ship Towed Acoustic Deception Device (STADD) was deployed on USCG—™CHASE throughout both of the exercises. Preliminary information received indicates that—™the GATO was lured toward and attacked the CHASE, (CHASE 052000Z JUN 83). The—™system is holding up JJЂяpability.——™™f.™(S)™The Global Positioning System (GPS) deployed on the JFK has been basically—™inoperative since the start of the exercise. The Staff is awaiting receipt of new program—™tapes from NOSC. The writer suggested that if the tapes were the only thing preventing—™the use of the GPS, then CCG-8 could send a message to NOSC requesting the Stan—™Miyashiro drop off the tapes in London while in transit to meet the USS BIDDLE. The—™Staff really praises the system and with the problems encouJJЂяcoordination, ASW/ASUW C&R net, TTY, and link eleven relay.—™The system has been flown nearly 1000 hours and works quite well although the following—™problems were noted:——™™™™1.™(C)™During the first three or four days, linking problems were —™encountered. This is attributed to training the new users in the operational—™procedures required to link with the POD.——™™™™2.™(C)™The POD was installed once between the fuselage and the engine on—™an S-3, thereby shadowing the antennae and causing intermitJJЂя the Staff briefings every morning and evening as well as —™transmitted, via daily message, to all the ships in company. The information is—™also included in the AIRCREN flight briefings.——™™c.™(S)™The HF PROPHET and COPS programs are used to determine the optimal—™frequency to be used in the HF spectrum when not in EMCON Bravo. If LRI were—™used, the COPS program would be used to determine the frequency and power levels—™to effect LRI communications. The PROPHET System is used to validate the JJЂяand there appears to be no further cable problems when deploying the—™array . (During previous exercises two cables were damaged during first few—™deployments).——™™e.™(S)™The Ship Identification Demonstration Model (SIDM) is still on track to be—™deployed on the USS BIDDLE for the BALTOPS Exercise. COMDESRON 32 in USS—™BIDDLE requested a waiver to use the SLQ-20 in the active mode during this follow-on—™exercise but was turned down by CINCLANTFLT. The demonstration test will be without—™this caJKЂяntered with the SINS lately—™(60NM to 100NM off in position) the GPS would have been invaluable.—™—™12.™„(U) SESS Operations:…——™During this deployement the SESS was outfitted with some programmable Watkins Johnson—™(WJ) Receivers, Sony Wide Band Receivers, a prototype Automatic CW Recognition/—™Encoder Device, a Cryptologic Combat Support Console (CCSC) and the SKR-7. It should—™be noted that many ships with SESS are buying the Sony (ICF 2000) Receivers because the—™standard receivers are manuallKJKЂяy tuned and man inensive to operate. The SESS crew stated—™that because of the WJ's and Sony receivers they had the most automated space, aboard a—™ship, in the Navy. Interestingly enough, these receivers are relatively inexpensive and are—™not the state-of-the-art receivers but are a magnitude better than the systems used in—™most SESSs. The CCSC and SKR-7 were being evaluated by OPTEVOFR. Questions—™regarding these systems should be directed to OPTEVFOR, LCDR R. Stewart.——™13.™„(U) NRL P-3 FlKKЂя0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Yj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™14.™(„U) Daily 1900 Tactics Meeting:…——™™a.™(U)™ The writer was afforded the opportunity to sit-in and participate in a daily—™tactics meeting held at 1900 in the War Room. Participants were CCG-8/Staff, the ship's—™CO, OPS, CAG and some squadron COs. During the meeting the day's events were—™reviewed, a weather forecast was briefed, and the tactics to be used for upcoming events—™were discussed. Usually there was a short brief (5 KKЂяinformation as well as insights into threat capability. He assisted—™in maintaining the data bases and interfaced with the Staff. During the exercise—™he was briefed on the ship's systems and aircraft capabilities. He also briefed on—™the collection programs FTD is responsible for and how those programs and national—™systems can possibly be of assistance to the Navy. Persons briefed were—™COMSECONDFLT, CCG-8 and their Staff, both the JFK and USS MT WHITNEY — ™ships N2, SESS and Supplot Heads, GLЂя. During the meeting the day's events were—™reviewed, a weather forecast was briefed, and the tactics to be used for upcoming events—™were discussed. Usually there was a short brief (5 min) by a member of the group,—™concerning a subject of general interest. RADM Flatley really stressed brain-storming of—™ideas and dissemination of information. These meetings were very helful in providing an—™understanding on how a CARGRU operates, the objectives to be met, and—™accomplishments obtained during KKЂяy By:…——™™a.™(S)™NRL flew it's P-3 over the TF to measure the differences of SRBOC and—™the NATO SEANAT chaff without IR. Specific results of this test will have to be—™obtained directly from NRL. NRL's P-3 has the capability to simulate some of the threat—™missiles and radars and offered to simulate these while flying within the TF to provide—™training for the EW operators and to exercise the EW systems. The simulation—™was successful and the operators appreciated the training they received.—•ђKKЂяmin) by a member of the group,—™concerning a subject of general interest. RADM Flatley really stressed brain-storming of—™ideas and dissemination of information. These meetings were very helful in providing an—™understanding on how a CARGRU operates, the objectives to be met, and—™accomplishments obtained during each phase of the exercise.——™15.™(„U) Mr. Ken Miller (FTD Wright-Patterson AFB):…——™™a.™(U)™Mr. Miller assisted in evaluating the Cќ3њCM support effort by providing—™new threat data and K=Ђяetc!LGЂяhe systems used in—™most SESSs. The CCSC and SKR-7 were being evaluated by OPTEVOFR. Questions—™regarding these systems should be directed to OPTEVFOR, LCDR R. Stewart.——™13.™„NRL P-3 Fly By (U)…——™™a.™(S)™NRL flew it's P-3 over the TF to measure the differences of SRBOC and—™the NATO SEANAT chaff without IR. Specific results of this test will have to be—™obtained directly from NRL. NRL's P-3 has the capability to simulate some of the threat—™missiles and radars and offered to simulate these whL=LЂяedictions because the usefulness of the predictions—™as a weekly and long term planning aid was being evaluated.——™™d.™(S)™The satellite overpass prediction was well within the accuracy—™required for short and long term planning even when the CHARLIE elements—™of 26 May 83 were used to calculate the number of overpasses throughout the—™entire exercise. To check the validity of predicting monthly satellite overpasses, the—™CHARLIE elements for 26 May 83 and 13 June 83 were used to calculate the numLLЂяon prediction is probably the easiest because of the slow—™speed of the threat and the resources available to track it. Conversely the—™subsurface target location is the most difficult to predict accurately. The—™ASW information (S3, SOSUS, Intel, Sonar, etc.) is provided to the ship but—™unless the submarine is sighted or is acoustically held for long periods it—™is difficult to HULTEC and target them. It is difficult to correlate the data—™and maintain a good accurate ASW picture because of thLLЂяber of—™passes for the same estimated PIM 14 June 83. Both sets of data agreed as to the exact—™number of passes. This indicates that when a similar space order of battle exists one set—™of CHARLIE elements can be used to develop a satellite overpass prediction for at least—™19 days. A comparison of the satellite rise and set times was also accomplished using—™the above inputs and PIM information. The comparison showed a maximum difference of—™two minutes in either the rise or set times. ThisLLЂяe variation in the—™accuracy of the sensor information provided.—•ђ0`@э1@AATэ21PTA0P0P4P0A?????э3Hэ4Xj@K@@@э8@H@pHP@@@@э9@@@@ыьыьэђ™™f.™(S)™In addition to the 30 day and 72 hour charts, a RORSAT vulnerability—™viewgraph was provided as a briefing aide because the OCEAN SAFARI Exercise—™incorporated two BOGUS RORSATS. The RORSAT viewgraph was similar to the one—™developed last year. Instead of using a maneuvering board chart the vulnerability—™swath was overlayed on a map with the ship also indicK<Ђяeach phase of the exercise.——™15.™(„U) Mr. Ken Miller (FTD Wright-Patterson AFB):…——™™a.™(U)™Mr. Miller assisted in evaluating the Cќ3њCM support effort by providing—™new threat data and information as well as insights into threat capability. He assisted—™in maintaining the data bases and interfaced with the Staff. During the exercise—™he was briefed on the ship's systems and aircraft capabilities. He also briefed on—™the collection programs FTD is responsible for and how those programs and natiL?Ђяated. This was accomplished by—™using the vulnerability information provided by the TEK 4052 RECSAT Program and—™plotting it on the HP 9020 display. The display was transferred to the hardcopy unit—™which was used as the master to make a viewgraph.——™™g.™(C)™To summarize the above; the 72 hour and 24 hour charts are useful in—™providing accurate daily pictures of the threat if they are maintained routinely.—™The 30 day chart is useful as a planning and a reconstruction aid. Automation—™of the upLLЂя indicates that the same CHARLIE—™elements could be used to calculate safe times for a week without affecting the success—™of the presently used satellite countermeasures. A further study should be made to—™determine why the slight difference in the satellite rise and set times occur (i.e., it's—™calculation round offs, etc.).——™™e.™(S)™The aircraft arrival prediction could be determined to within an—™hour or less by using the information provided to a SESS equipped ship. The—™surface ship positiEKЂя, a Cryptologic Combat Support Console (CCSC) and the SKR-7. It should—™be noted that many ships with SESS are buying the Sony (ICF 2000) Receivers because the—™standard receivers are manually tuned and man inensive to operate. The SESS crew stated—™that because of the WJ's and Sony receivers they had the most automated space, aboard a—™ship, in the Navy. Interestingly enough, these receivers are relatively inexpensive and are—™not the state-of-the-art receivers but are a magnitude better than t